MISSOURI TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND SUPERINTENDENTS'

PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE PAY

The undersigned, approved by the Department Chair of Graduate Studies in Education, have examined a dissertation entitled:

MISSOURI TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND SUPERINTENDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE PAY

Presented by Julie B. Routh, a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Education and hereby certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance.

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Dr. Pamela Hedgpeth, Advisor/Chair
Professor of Graduate Studies in Educational Administration

_____

Dr. Robert Perry, Committee Member
Professor of Graduate Studies in Educational Administration

_____

Dr. Patricia Wall, Committee Member
Assistant Superintendent, Bolivar R-1 Schools

MISSOURI TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND SUPERINTENDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE PAY

A Dissertation
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In Partial Fulfillment
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By

Julie B. Routh, B.S., M.S., Ed.Spec.

Dr. Pamela Hedpgeth, Dissertation Advisor

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ABSTRACT

Teacher pay has traditionally been based on a single salary schedule that defines a teacher's compensation based on years of experience and highest degree earned. However, many believe the single salary schedule is outdated and ineffective due to federal and state mandates. Performance pay continues to be examined by legislators, teachers, and professional organizations as a possible avenue to compensate educators. This study was designed to analyze the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward teacher performance pay. Guiding this study was the overarching research question: What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay? Supporting research questions included:

a. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may impact student achievement?
b. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it should be tied to teacher evaluation?
c. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward performance pay and how it may affect the recruitment and retention of teachers?
d. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may affect school climate?

This study was conducted in public schools across the state of Missouri. A stratified random sample of small, medium, and large K-12 Missouri public school districts was used. An important part of this study was the development of an attitudinal survey. The survey was tested

to be valid and reliable with the purpose of being made available to future researchers. The pilot process included an expert pilot utilizing Rovinelli and Hambleton's index of item-objective congruency, a pre-pilot, and a 48-person pilot. At each pilot step, factor analyses were conducted, resulting in multiple revisions to the survey instrument. The survey utilized four scales: impact on student achievement, teacher evaluation, recruitment and retention of teachers, and effect on school climate. The demographic data allowed separation of the various populations and comparison of groups; for example, teachers and administrators.

From the research conducted it is apparent that teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools are not supportive of teacher performance pay. Further study of successful programs outlined in the review of literature would be beneficial. Additionally, using the attitudinal survey in districts which are currently implementing teacher performance pay would be advantageous to schools considering teacher performance pay. Modification of participant groups to enlarge or alter the sample size could include other educational leaders in Missouri public schools or in the United States (e.g., other central office administrators and school board members) and various groups of public stakeholders involved in educational policies or practices (e.g., legislative members or leaders of teacher organizations). Further study in topics related to student achievement and teacher performance is essential. These topics include teacher quality, leadership styles during times of major accountability changes, value-added achievement, formative and summative assessment tools for evaluating instructional practices, teacher/student motivation, and the influence of accountability on those entering or not entering the teaching profession.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Teacher pay has traditionally been based on a single salary schedule that defines a teacher's compensation based on years of experience and highest degree earned. According to Podgursky and Springer (2007), finding ways to increase student achievement and basing education on objective standards have been popular topics among boards of education and other policymakers in the United States in recent years. Educational reform is one of the longest ongoing projects in history, but there has been a focus on education in America since the publication of "A Nation at Risk" in 1983 (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). According to Balcells (2012),

> further serving as education reform catalysts are the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), national legislation aimed at eliminating achievement gaps between student population subgroups, and Race to the Top (RTTT), a federal educational grant competition that awards funds to states based on each state's adoption of legislation that compensates educators based on performance rather than years of experience and credentials. (p. 3)

Missouri was one of 36 states and the District of Columbia that applied for a waiver regarding some specific requirements of NCLB (Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education [MODESE], 2012). This waiver was approved in June 2012, and the approval gives Missouri more autonomy in guiding improvement efforts in its schools. One of the principles of the waiver focuses on supporting effective instruction and leadership. This principle requires Missouri to hold educators accountable for continuous improvement and is articulated through

the state's Educator Evaluation System. Missouri will be required to attach a proportion of a teacher's formal evaluation to student achievement data (MODESE, 2012).

Problem Statement

The political- and market-based pressures are causing boards of education to investigate performance-based pay and other alternative methods of paying teachers in public school districts beyond the traditional salary schedule and the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents, those possibly most affected, are not being obtained.

Rationale for the Study

Performance pay is best related to Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory of employee motivation. This theory suggests performance can be influenced positively by monetary incentives if workers have a high expectancy that performance can be achieved, if workers believe a correlation exists between performance and the likelihood of the reward, and if workers find monetary rewards attractive. Therefore, if teachers believe increased effort will not result in improved performance, low expectancy may cause teachers to withhold effort.

According to Meyers (2009), "interest in teacher pay-for-performance plans has gained popularity in recent policy discussions as a means to improve instructional effectiveness, enhance student achievement, and increase organizational productivity" (p. 1). The increased interest stems from a growing belief the single salary schedule is no longer an appropriate or effective pay system (Meyers, 2009). The single salary schedule is a system of steps and lanes. Steps are based on additional years of service and lanes are based on coursework or advanced degrees. Teachers with the same years of experience and levels of education receive the same salary (Gratz, 2009). Buddin and Zamarro (2009) have found teacher education and experience has little effect on student achievement gains. In their research they found "a five-year increase

in teaching experience affected student achievement less than 1 percentage point. Similarly, the level of education held by a teacher proved to have no effect on student achievement in the classroom" (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009, p. 115). Missouri is at a pivotal time concerning performance pay. The passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and Race to the Top has drawn increased national attention concerning teacher evaluation systems and baseline student data systems, as well as performance-based pay (Dillon, 2009). Missouri's educators should possess knowledge of the legislation and its potential effects on education.

Research Questions

This study explores the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in randomly selected Missouri public school systems toward performance pay. The following research question and subset questions will guide the study:

1. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay?
    a. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may impact student achievement?
    b. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it should be tied to teacher evaluation?
    c. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward performance pay and how it may affect the recruitment and retention of teachers?

d. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may affect school climate?

Limitations

Limitations to this study include the truthfulness of the survey participants and the survey format. The data used in this study will be survey data obtained through an attitudinal survey. The truthfulness of survey participants may affect the outcomes of the research. The respondents had to access a web-based survey to record their responses, which might lead to younger teachers and those who feel more comfortable using technology being more likely to participate.

Delimitations

Delimitations to this study include the population of interest. The research is limited to randomly selected teachers, administrators, and superintendents employed in public schools in the state of Missouri.

Definitions

Alternative compensation: A multitude of systems that pay educators in a way that differs from the traditional single salary schedule, including extra pay added to a base salary (Educator Compensation Institute, 2007). Common alternative names include merit pay and performance pay.

Performance pay: Compensation that is linked to a measure of performance, such as student achievement or employee evaluations (Ramirez, 2010). For the purpose of this study performance pay is used in place of merit pay.

Single salary schedule: A steps and lanes salary grid. Steps are based on additional years of service and lanes are based on coursework or advanced degrees. This is also known as a traditional salary schedule (Gratz, 2009).

Conclusion

The single salary schedule has proved to be a popular compensation model because people find it fair, transparent, easy to understand, and predictable (Ramirez, 2010). However, critics argue the single salary schedule is outdated, fails to attract the best college graduates into teaching, and provides no incentives for practicing educators to produce results. As a result, a number of states and school districts have begun experimenting with performance pay plans, in which teachers are compensated in part for their students' academic performance (Corcoran & Roy, 2009). Teacher performance pay has been researched recently, but little has been done to determine the perspectives of those impacted by performance pay. This study will explore teacher performance pay while assessing teachers, administrators, and superintendents' perceptions of this pay system in the state of Missouri public school systems. In Chapter Two, current literature will be used to investigate the theoretical frameworks relevant to work-related motivation, the history of teacher pay, teacher quality, teacher evaluation systems, proponents and opponents of teacher performance pay, ineffective and effective performance pay programs, along with alternatives to teacher performance pay programs. In Chapter Three, the methodology for collecting and analyzing the data will be presented. In Chapter Four, the data and information that resulted from answering the research question will be presented. In Chapter Five, a summary, discussion of the research question, and a review of the discovered data and findings will be presented.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

Recent policy action concentrates around the initiative of connecting teacher compensation and promotion to performance. Teacher evaluations, tenure, salaries, and student performance are issues currently facing stakeholders (Barker & Searchwell, 2010), with one major issue being tied to teacher compensation and performance pay (Adams, Heywood, & Rothstein, 2009). The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents surrounding performance pay. Following a review of relevant literature, overarching themes surrounding performance pay emerged: theoretical frameworks, historical perspectives, teacher quality influences on student achievement, teacher evaluation systems used to promote teacher quality, proponents and/or opponents of performance pay, ineffective pay programs, effective pay programs, and alternatives to performance pay. This next section provides relevant information regarding the potential impact performance pay will have on job satisfaction and motivation within the framework of the school organization.

Theoretical Frameworks

According to Stronge, Gareis, and Little, "a central issue in the debate over teacher compensation systems, particularly when discussing any form of performance-based pay, is the degree to which motivation and compensation are related" (2006, p. 2). Performance pay is directly tied to Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory. Vroom's model of employee motivation described the processes that link behaviors to rewards and suggested that performance can be positively influenced by monetary incentives if workers have a high expectancy that performance can be achieved, if workers believe a correlation exists between performance and

the likelihood of reward, and if workers find monetary rewards attractive (Vroom, 1964).

Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory states there are certain factors in the workplace that cause either job satisfaction or job dissatisfaction. The motivation-hygiene theory divided work-related motivation into hygiene factors and motivation factors. According to Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, "hygiene factors consist of extrinsic factors, including supervision, interpersonal relations, physical working conditions, salary, company policies and administrative practices, benefits, and job security" (1967, p. 45). Job dissatisfaction occurs when the aforementioned factors are less than what an employee deems satisfactory. Herzberg et al. (1967) further found "intrinsic motivational factors, which provide job satisfaction for employees, include achievement, advancement, the work itself, recognition, and responsibility" (p. 44). Praise, acknowledgement, and positive reinforcement fit into this category. Job satisfaction occurs when hygiene and motivation factors fulfill the employee and meet the need for self-actualization, while undesirable working conditions, bad company policies, and poor management lead to job dissatisfaction. Money does not act as a motivator unless connected to recognition or achievement. Herzberg et al. (1967) further determined that salary has more potency to promote job dissatisfaction than job satisfaction. Pink (2009) asserts "the best use of money as a motivator is to pay people enough to take the issue of money off the table" (pp. 191-192). One myth regarding performance pay implies people work for money. However, good teaching is not about money, but about a sense of calling (Ramirez, 2010). Pink (2009) agreed with Ramirez and added "instead of fretting about paying their bills on an insufficient salary or scheming to get a small bonus, teachers could focus on the work they love" (p. 192). While currently a topic of focus in education today, interest in performance pay has waxed and waned over the years. To plan for the future of teacher pay, an in-depth study of the history of teacher

pay is required.

Historical Perspectives

According to Gratz (2009) performance pay began in England in 1710 when teacher salaries were tied to student proficiency in the areas of reading, writing, and arithmetic. This practice continued to the late nineteenth century, when it was replaced by a salary schedule similar to the current system used in the United States (Covey, 2009). Compensation for teachers has changed slowly in the United States and has been seen in three primary stages: boarding in the homes of townspeople, grade-based pay where teachers at higher levels were paid more, and the single salary schedule. This transition took more than a century, as the one-room schoolhouse gave way to consolidated school systems. In the initial phase of American schooling, rural communities hired teachers who boarded at the homes of different townspeople. This provided a living to young teachers, was inexpensive for the community, and allowed the community tight control over what was taught and the teacher's life. Teachers received no formal training and most had only an elementary education themselves. Qualifications had more to do with the basics and ability to control the class. As such, teaching was both a low-pay and low-status occupation (Gratz, 2009).

By the end of the 1800s, the rural system became less attractive and qualified teachers were harder to find and keep (Gratz, 2009). As the population in urban areas increased, the need for public school systems became evident. Civic leaders believed public schools should provide a common school experience for all students, promote cultural understanding, and teach the American values and ideas (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). As different states moved to create common schools funded by taxes, schools were reorganized into age-graded classes and new curricula were developed. The consolidation of schools led to standardized teacher salaries, and

by the end of the nineteenth century, most school districts were using the grade compensation model. This approach to compensation paid teachers for the level of skill thought needed to educate a student at a specific grade level, recognizing that teachers at the higher levels usually had more training. Women were paid substantially less to teach at the lower levels, while men were paid more to teach in the upper levels (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).

The system used currently, the single salary schedule, was first adopted in the Denver and Des Moines school districts in 1921. Most educators viewed the single salary schedule as fair, free of potential biases, and easy to understand and administer (Goldhaber, 2009; Scherer, 2003). The single salary schedule was so popular that by 1950, 97 percent of all the schools in the United States had adopted a single salary pay schedule for teachers (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).

Performance pay plans again emerged for discussion in the 1950s after *Why Johnny Can't Read* (Flesch, 1955) made the claim that children in the United States were not keeping up with their counterparts in Europe. The launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union in 1957 further exacerbated the national concern over poor school performance. This message implied public schools in the United States were educating their youth poorly when compared to other prominent countries, and this lesser education was a threat to America's democratic society. A White House Education Conference declared teachers should be rewarded for their ability (Toch & Rothman, 2008), and thus the quality of education would improve. Congress reacted and passed the National Defense Education Act of 1958 that authorized money for college and research in math and science. At this juncture, math and science "… joined reading as the most valued and most highly funded subjects in schools across the United States" (Armstrong, 2006,

p. 20). The federal government became increasingly enmeshed in administering funding to schools.

Additional efforts to reform the single salary schedule became widespread in the 1980s, with the introduction of broad raises across the profession, experimental performance pay, and career ladder systems (Stronge et al., 2006). The publication of the 1983 *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform* reported the need for a core curriculum, national academic standards, and educational equity for all children (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). This report noted teacher salaries should be competitive, market sensitive, and performance-based (Stronge et al., 2006). During this period in time, much of the school reform measures called for redefining school structure through quick fixes often centered on standardization. Many districts reported the same challenges that exist in current performance pay endeavors. Those challenges included difficulty in:

- designing reliable systems of distinguishing good from great teaching;
- calculating optimal amount and distribution of rewards;
- establishing a solid value-added connection between individual teacher inputs and student outputs;
- removing altogether or reducing the likelihood of unfair or biased evaluation as the stakes got higher;
- standardizing teacher evaluation across schools and districts (Balcells, 2012, p. 9; Goodman & Turner, 2011, p. 67).

Many of these late twentieth century experiments with performance pay ended when teacher unions swept in with more equitable single salary schedules (Podgursky and Springer, 2007).

From the work done in these past decades, recommendations for improving schools have more recently centered on academic excellence and accountability through achievement testing in a more systemic approach (e.g., the First National Education Summit, America 2000, the National Assessment of Educational Progress, Goals 2000: Educate America Act, and Improving America's Schools Act). "Legislative activity in the 1990s thereby created the national framework that ultimately led to the crowning achievement of academic achievement discourse, the No Child Left Behind Act" (Armstrong, 2006, p. 23). NCLB has been given the goal of "raising the achievement levels of all students, especially underperforming groups, and to close the achievement gap that parallels race and class" (Darling-Hammond, 2007, p. 642). Under its initial presidential administration, NCLB was accompanied with the $100 million Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) in federal support. This grant process was aimed at encouraging experimentation with performance pay. The TIF grants were awarded to school districts that promised to develop and implement performance pay programs (Gratz, 2009). The goals of TIF include:

- improve student achievement by increasing teacher and principal effectiveness;
- reform teacher and principal compensation systems so that teachers and principals are rewarded for increases in student achievement;
- increase the number of effective teachers teaching poor, minority, and disadvantaged students in hard-to-staff subjects; and
- create performance-based compensation system (Albright, 2011, pp. 15-16; Gratz, 2009, p. 238).

President Obama and the U.S. Department of Education continue to support the TIF Program (New America Foundation, 2013). In 2012, Congress budgeted $289 million for 35 new TIF

grants. In 2013, Congress budgeted $284 million to support 92 continuing awards granted in prior years.

Most recently, grants under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, including Race to the Top, have provided a monetary impetus to change policies in many states. Across the country, teacher quality and subsequent evaluation tools are changing as new accountability measures are being enacted (Weber, 2007). Due to money allocations from the federal and state governments and the public call for increased accountability in public education, educators recognize a connection between student achievement data and teacher quality measures is inevitable. With the educational policy implications of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) and the grant monies connected to school improvement efforts, it is imperative to look at the possible influence this legislation has had since its inception and its future implications for educators of public schools in Missouri. The United States Department of Education approved Missouri's Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) waiver in June 2012. This waiver gave Missouri flexibility from NCLB requirements (Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education [MODESE], 2012, para. 1). According to MODESE (2012), the waiver "allows Missouri to use its own accountability system to more effectively identify struggling schools, to efficiently direct resources to struggling schools, and to recognize schools achieving exemplary results" (para. 1). One of the guiding principles of the waiver includes holding educators accountable for continuous improvement. In May 2013 the Missouri State Board of Education adopted the Educator Evaluation System. This system includes seven essential principles of effective evaluation, with four of them tied directly to student and teacher performance. As a result of the evaluation

system, districts are "empowered to recognize and utilize highly effective educators to improve student learning" (MODESE, 2013, para. 2).

The Obama Administration created the $4.3 billion Race to the Top fund to encourage states to implement performance pay systems and amend education policies (United States Department of Education, 2013). The funds were included in the $787 billion economic stimulus program, provided in 2009, by the federal government. As of 2013 the Race to the Top initiative has committed over $4 billion to 19 states that have crafted plans that address the four key areas of K-12 education reform. These areas include

> the development of rigorous standards and better assessments; adoption of better data systems to provide schools, teachers, and parents with information about student progress; support for teachers and school leaders to become more effective; and increased emphasis and resources for the rigorous interventions needed to turn around the lowest-performing schools. (United States Department of Education, 2013, para. 2)

Performance pay plans in the United States have waxed and waned over the years. Interest in performance pay has tended to be prevalent when the Americans become concerned with the state of the economy. When the economy became troubled, the concern regarding the educational preparation of students for an advanced society made the headlines. Once the economy stabilized, the topic faded (Gratz, 2009). Historically a key purpose of performance pay was to improve teacher quality, which in turn has a direct effect on student achievement.

Teacher Quality Influences on Student Achievement

According to Stronge (2007), "the quality of teaching that occurs every day in every classroom is one of the most critical elements in the success of any school" (p. iv). Years of research on teacher quality support the statement that effective teachers not only make students

feel good about school and learning, but also their work actually results in increased student achievement. The quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers (Tucker & Stronge, 2005). Similarly, Marzano (2007) notes, "If the relationship between the teacher and the student is good, then everything else that occurs in the classroom seems to be enhanced" (p. 150). Marzano's research has shown "teachers' actions in their classrooms have twice the impact on student achievement as do school policies regarding curriculum, assessment, staff collegiality, and community involvement" (2003, p. 172). Stronge's (2007) book, *Qualities of Effective Teachers*, focused on specific teacher behaviors which contribute to student achievement including personality characteristics, preparation, classroom management, and monitoring of student progress. Barton (2004) analyzed research knowledge and available statistics to determine why the school achievement gap persists. Barton identified 14 factors related to student achievement. Of the 14 factors, eight occur outside the school environment. These factors include birth weight, lead poisoning, malnourishment, parent availability, parent participation, parent reading to students, mobility, and television watching. The remaining six factors occur within the school and include rigor of the curriculum, experienced teachers, teacher preparation, class size, technology-assisted instruction, and safety. Barton (2004) concluded "achievement gaps by race/ethnicity and income mirror inequalities in those aspects of schooling, early life, and home circumstances that research has linked to school achievement" (p. 10).

A study conducted by Sanders and Horn in 1994 revealed a 39 percentage-point difference in student achievement between students with the "most effective" and "least effective" teachers (as cited in Marzano, 2003). In classrooms led by teachers characterized as "most effective," students posted achievement gains of 53 percentage points over the course of

one academic year, whereas in classrooms led by "least effective" teachers, student achievement gains averaged 14 percentage points (Marzano, 2003). Researchers have identified teacher quality as one of the most important aspects of school systems (Marzano, 2007; Stronge, 2007; Schmoker, 2006;). Best practices are the key to effective teacher quality (Schmoker, 2006). Although some disagree, test scores may provide valuable information for teachers and schools. This data may be used to make informed curriculum and instructional decisions including implementing best practices. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is the "largest nationally representative and continuing assessment of what America's students know and can do in various subject areas" (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013, para. 1). Assessments are conducted periodically in mathematics, reading, science, writing, the arts, civics, economics, geography, U.S. history, and beginning in 2014, in technology and engineering literacy. NAEP results serve as a "common metric for all states since NAEP assessments are administered using the same sets of test booklets across the nation. The assessments remain essentially the same from year to year, which permits NAEP to provide a clear picture of student academic progress over time" (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013, para. 1).

According to the National Center for Education Statistics (2013), "data can be used to compare states and jurisdictions based on the average scale scores for selected groups of public school students within a single assessment year" (para. 1). For 2013, Missouri ranked 39th in fourth grade mathematics and 31st in eighth grade mathematics. Missouri was ranked 28th in fourth grade reading and 27th in eighth grade reading (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). Test scores can provide valuable information to teachers and schools to formulate curriculum and instructional decisions and to determine teacher effectiveness. Federal and state

mandates are requiring districts to discover ways to increase student achievement, and researchers have identified teacher quality as one such influence (Albright, 2011). States that have applied for and received the waiver for NCLB are required to develop teacher evaluation systems that measure and promote teacher efficacy.

Teacher Evaluation Systems Used to Promote Teacher Quality

According to Charlotte Danielson (2011) the purpose of teacher evaluation is to ensure teacher quality and to promote professional development. A commitment to professional learning is important because teaching is so hard that it can always be improved. Toch and Rothman (2008) believe an effective evaluation system must be fully integrated with other district systems and policies and a primary factor in decisions such as which teachers receive tenure, how teachers are assigned and retained, how teachers are compensated and advance, what professional development teachers receive, and when and how teachers are dismissed. Only by attaching stakes to evaluation outcomes will teachers and administrators invest in the hard work of creating a truly rigorous and credible evaluation system (Toch & Rothman, 2008). The difference in teacher quality is described as "high quality teachers are ones who consistently obtain higher than expected gains in student performance, while low quality teachers are ones who consistently obtain lower than expected gains"(Hanushek, Kain, O'Brien, & Rivkin, 2005, p. 90). Many recent studies have supported the idea of using teacher observation to grow teacher effectiveness (Hanushek et al., 2005).

Teacher efforts in discipline, mentoring, citizenships and other factors may be important to the overall learning environment at a school (Asch, 2005). Given the difficulty of measuring the full range of school outputs, principal evaluations of teachers are likely to play an important role in improving teaching. Jacob and Lefgren examined whether principals' evaluations of

teachers in schools were related to student achievement. As part of their study, they surveyed school principals and asked them to rate teachers. These ratings were used as explanatory variables in a longitudinal model of student achievement, where students were linked with individual classroom teachers. The results showed principal ratings were a significant predictor of student achievement and the ratings were a stronger predictor of classroom success than were teacher characteristics like experience and educational preparation that are typically used in compensation tables. The study found considerable compression of teacher ratings. The average teacher scored 8.1 on a 10-point scale where 8 is the top of the "very good" category and 9 is "exceptional." This extreme compression occurs on a survey where teacher evaluations are not part of any formal district assessment of teaching proficiency. The pattern of compression is likely to be greater with high-stakes principal evaluations that have consequences for teacher compensation (Jacob & Lefgren as cited in Asch, 2005).

In a State of the States 2013 report, the National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) reported that as of September 2013, 35 states and the District of Columbia Public Schools now require that student achievement is a significant or the most significant factor in teacher evaluations. Across the 35 states and District of Columbia Public Schools where student achievement is intended to be a significant or the most significant criterion for judging teacher performance, NCTQ finds "most states have yet to connect the dots, with little policy in place to use information about teacher performance in ways that can improve practice and ensure that all students have effective teachers" (Doherty & Jacobs, 2013, p. 27). As of September 2013, only about half of the states with ambitious evaluation designs require that tenure decisions must be influenced by teacher evaluations (Doherty & Jacobs, 2013).

In June 2012, the U.S. Department of Education approved Missouri's Elementary and

Secondary Education Act (ESEA) waiver giving the state flexibility from No Child Left Behind (NCLB) requirements (Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education [MODESE], 2012, para. 1). Every district must have an improved, effective evaluation process in place by the 2014-2015 school year. Missouri's Educator Evaluation System was created, field-tested, piloted, and refined by hundreds of educators across the state. As school districts across the nation seek ways to achieve the goal of raising teacher salaries in order to retain highly-qualified and effective teachers, the traditional salary schedule may be in jeopardy. Legislators, business leaders, and teacher unions have all studied performance pay and emerged as either proponents or opponents of performance pay.

Proponents and/or Opponents of Performance Pay

Currently, the issue of performance pay continues to gain momentum. There are good reasons to focus on teacher compensation as an avenue for school reform. The structure of compensation in education, which is dictated by the single salary schedule, is clearly out of step with the way the broader labor market functions (Goldhaber, 2009). In a survey conducted by the National Comprehensive Council of Teacher Quality (NCCTQ), seventy percent saw the single salary schedule as a drawback and that younger teachers want to work in an environment that rewards performance (Toch & Rothman, 2008). Since salary is determined by experience and additional education, there is no financial incentive for teachers to try harder. Policymakers have believed equal pay, regardless of the quality of teacher's output, provides a disincentive for performing above and beyond (Gratz, 2009). A well-designed performance pay program should reward educators who choose to go above and beyond making an investment in their schools and districts (Hess, 2010). Gratz (2009) believes pay related to productivity would provide an incentive for teachers to perform to the best of their abilities. According to Hess (2010), a one-

size-fits-all compensation method means the best teachers are paid too little and the least effective teachers are paid too much. Hess concludes performance pay can help attract and retain quality educators.

President Obama and U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan have included performance pay among their goals for education (Gratz, 2009). Secretary Duncan has called performance pay his highest priority (Toch, 2009). While Secretary Duncan has emphasized he does not support the idea test scores alone should dictate evaluations, tenure, and pay, he does believe that omitting student achievement in teacher evaluations is illogical (Gratz, 2009).

Throughout modern history, the business sector has tended to support educational accountability. Business-dominated reports on education have almost always contained a statement in support of educational accountability and have often offered support for performance pay for teachers (Gratz, 2009). *A Nation at Risk* was released in 1983 by the business-supported National Commission on Excellence in Education and recommended that teacher salary, promotion, tenure, and retention decisions be tied to an effective evaluation system in order for superior teachers to be rewarded, average ones encouraged, and poor ones either improved or terminated (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). As performance pay grew in popularity again in the 1990s, business leaders again supported a payment for results approach (Slotnik, Smith, Glass, & Helms, 2004). In the late 1990s, the concept of paying teachers based on their performance was strongly endorsed by such groups as the Business Roundtable (BRT) and the National Alliance for Business (NAB). In 1999, the BRT and NAB endorsed helping interested school systems develop ways of compensating teachers that rewarded increased student achievement as part of a three-part school improvement strategy that included high standards, rigorous standards-based assessments, and better

accountability (Gratz, 2009). In a brief for business leaders written in July 2000, the BRT/NAB alliance illustrated the business point of view:

> used widely in the private sector, pay for performance is a strategic compensation system that ties financial and other rewards to increased performance. Many features of the current teacher compensation system are outdated and inadequate, and pay for performance can help heighten the focus on improving student achievement. An aligned system of standards, assessments, and accountability is essential to the effectiveness of our schools. Pay for performance can be an effective element of an aligned system. The benefits of pay-for-performance are well-known in the private sector, where compensation is frequently used as a management tool to achieve organizational goals. The vast majority of large US companies now use some form of performance-based pay with at least some portion of their employees—an increase of 50 percent since 1987. Research suggests that roughly two out of three such efforts result in increased productivity or other measureable improvements (Gratz, 2009, p. 69).

By 2001, BRT and NAB joined with the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to publish *Investing in Teaching*. Among other recommendations, this report proposed performance pay as both group bonuses for improvement and monetary rewards for individuals based on demonstrated knowledge and skills and students' academic performance (Gratz, 2009). The Teaching Commission released two reports, *Teaching at Risk: A Call to Action* in 2004 and *Teaching at Risk: Progress and Potholes* in 2006. The commission, comprised of prominent business and political leaders, sought to solve the problem of teaching by professionalizing the teaching profession. Among its proposals, the commission

recommended flexible compensation systems that recognize and reward excellence and incorporate market incentives (Gerstner, Ackerman, Barnes, & Beattie, 2006).

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has given $650 million to projects that advance educational priorities like charter schools, testing, and teacher effectiveness, awarded grants to some states to hire specialists to aid in the application process for Race to the Top round one (Ohanian, 2010, para. 3). According to Nancy C. Detert, chair of the Education Committee in the Florida Senate, "the Gates program and the Arne Duncan program are pretty much the same program" (as cited in Ohanian, 2010, para. 4). Mike Petrilli, vice president of the Thomas B. Fordham Institute, agrees, stating "it is not unfair to say that the Gates Foundation's agenda has become the country's agenda in education" (as cited in Ohanian, 2010, para. 4).

The policy position the teachers unions take appears to be quite influential in determining the direction of education policy (Gratz, 2009; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Goldhaber, 2009). Starting in the late 1990s, the two major national teacher unions and many of the locals began to embrace the concept of teacher accountability and to endorse various experiments to develop new compensation systems (Goldhaber, 2009; Gratz, 2009; Johnson & Papay, 2009). In particular, members of the Teachers Union Reform Network (TURN) committed themselves to finding ways to improve teaching and negotiate innovative forms of teacher compensation (Goldhaber, 2009; Gratz, 2009; Johnson & Papay, 2009). This network includes large cities such as Albuquerque, Boston, Denver, Los Angeles, Memphis, New York, and Pittsburgh, as well as affiliates of both the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). The AFT does not support eliminating the current single salary schedule, but it does support considering ways to enhance and improve it. The AFT endorses additional compensation to teachers who earn National Board Certification, who serve in shortage fields,

and who mentor incoming teachers. The AFT does support experiments in performance pay as long as the plans are part of an effort to support quality teaching, provide continuous professional development for teachers and paraprofessionals, encourage collegiality, and raise student achievement. The AFT has determined a well-designed compensation system should contain agreed-upon standards and measures of professional practice, clear steps to improving professional practice combined with the necessary supports, multiple opportunities to increase compensation and advancement, and multiple measures of student progress for school wide and/or group incentives (AFT, 2014).

According to the NEA (2014) "17 percent of new public school teachers leave the profession by the end of the first year and almost half leave within 5 years" (para. 2). The National Education Association has focused more directly on ways to raise salaries for teachers. Through its nationwide salary initiative the NEA has advocated for a $40,000 starting salary for all PreK-12 teachers, raises that exceed the cost of living in at least 50 percent of NEA higher education locals, and a minimum starting salary of $28,000 for all education support professionals (para. 3). NEA has believed teachers should move through the salary system for things that actually improve teaching and learning, such as experience, knowledge and skills, and National Board Certification. NEA concludes performance pay systems force teachers to compete, rather than cooperate. Performance pay systems create a disincentive for teachers to share information and teaching techniques. NEA has continued to advocate the current single salary schedule as the fairest, best understood, and most widely used approach to teacher compensation because it rewards knowledge and experience, which make a difference in teacher quality. In addition, a single salary schedule is a reliable predictor of future pay increases and school boards can more easily budget costs. NEA has further questioned the fairness and

objectivity of administrators completing evaluations (NEA, 2014). Both the AFT and the NEA agree the areas of additional compensation for teachers should include teachers who earn National Board Certification, work in hard-to-staff schools, serve as mentors, and participate in other professional activities (NEA, 2014; AFT, 2010).

The Missouri State Teachers Association (MSTA) opposes performance pay, including the use of standardized tests scores as a measurement of teacher performance or to determine future salary increases (MSTA, 2014). MSTA Executive Director Kent King (as cited in Heavin, 2007) stated "MSTA would be willing to entertain the idea of linking salaries to performance evaluations, but the state must first improve teacher pay as a whole" (para. 2). King further stated "if the state wants to consider allowing performance pay, lawmakers need to boost the minimum starting salary for teachers" (para. 3). King also said "a performance-based system would have to allow teachers to play a key role in developing any evaluation used to determine performance" (as cited in Heavin, 2007, para. 5).

Members of teacher unions' attitudes have become more open and less adversarial. Union leaders agree on improving student achievement through appropriate forms of accountability and an effective learning environment. This change is led both by individual union locals and by national leaders who recognize the growing national interest in accountability and who believe in effective teaching. These leaders are increasingly willing to experiment with forms of accountability they believe will improve the teaching process (Gratz, 2009; Hess & West, 2006; McElroy, 2005).

In 2013 the Harvard Program on Education Policy and Governance administered the seventh annual Education Next (EdNext) Poll to a representative sample of the U.S. adult population. The survey showed 55 percent of parents surveyed believed teacher salaries should

increase. When asked if they favored or opposed basing salaries of teachers in part on their students' academic progress on state tests, 49 percent of those surveyed were in favor (Henderson & Peterson, 2013).

The performance pay system has much opposition from educational leaders and organizations (Gratz, 2009). The opponents believe there is a better alternative than performance pay systems to reward teachers for student achievement (Johnson & Papay, 2009). Critics feel one alternative of performance pay is to offer extra money to only those people who teach specific courses, such as math and science; however, that is seen as unfair and showing favoritism (Klein, 2009). Amrein-Beardsley (2009) argued not all subjects or grade levels are assessed, which imposes accountability measures on some teachers while other teachers are exempt from being held accountable. Ravitch (2010), author and former Assistant Secretary of Education, concludes teacher performance pay is:

> like a bad penny that comes back again and again, but never works. The idea has been tried again and again since the 1920s and disappears because it does not work and disrupts the shared goals of the school. Yet reformers cling to the idea of merit pay because they believe that incentives and sanctions are a cure for everything. They have no evidence for their belief. Every teacher should have an equal opportunity for success; however, equality cannot be a reality (para. 10).

Teachers do not have control over class size, student abilities, student backgrounds, and student assignment (Ravitch, 2010; Amrein-Beardsley, 2009; Clabaugh, 2009).

The Phi Delta Kappa (PDK)/Gallup Poll has conducted an annual sampling of public opinion on the public schools since 1968 (Bushaw & Lopez, 2013). The PDK/Gallup Poll is a scientifically based survey of 1,001 Americans 18 years and older. This poll consistently finds

parents and citizens give their local schools high marks, but have a less favorable view of public schools across the country. In 2007, 81 percent of respondents supported using student performance on state tests in determining teacher pay. However, in 2013, Americans reversed their opinions, and now 58 percent oppose requiring that teacher evaluations include student scores on standardized tests. More than 70 percent of Americans have trust and confidence in the men and women who teach in public schools, a trend that is consistent from year to year (Bushaw & Lopez, 2013). As school districts and legislatures design performance pay programs, examining the mistakes of ineffective pay programs might provide insight in pitfalls to avoid (Stronge et al., 2006).

Ineffective Pay Programs

Performance pay for teachers is often proposed as a compensation system that will motivate teachers to increase student achievement. However, the promise of performance pay is dimmed by the failed attempts to implement performance pay programs in public schools over the last 75 years. The next section analyzes performance pay programs that have proven ineffective.

Governor's Educator Excellence Grant Program in Texas. The Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program identified the 100 highest-poverty high-performing schools in the state of Texas and awarded them noncompetitive grants, ranging from $60,000 to $220,000 each year for three years (Taylor, Springer, & Ehlert, 2008). Participating schools were required to use the awarded grant monies to develop performance incentives for high-performing educators. The GEEG program funding was divided into two parts. Part 1 funds were to be used for awards paid directly to teachers who teach four or more hours during the typical academic day (full-time teachers). Part 2 funds were to be used to provide awards to

other school personnel, or to fund professional development programs for teachers, induction programs for teachers, or other professional growth opportunities. Seventy-five percent of the total GEEG awards were dedicated to Part 1 incentives, while the remaining 25 percent were dedicated to funding Part 1 or Part 2 activities. TEA guidelines further stipulated Part 1 fund awards must be based on two criteria: success in improving student achievement (as evidenced by an objective performance measure) and a teacher's collaboration with faculty and staff. Although both student achievement and collaboration are required criteria of a school's GEEG plan, schools had a great deal of flexibility when it came to defining the actual performance measures and benchmarks used to evaluate teachers' performance.

Schools were notified of their eligibility for the program during the 2005-2006 school year and were required to develop and submit their incentive plan proposals by the end of that school year. The state recommended a $3,000 minimum bonus; however, the bonuses averaged $1,982 during the first year and $2,094 during the second year (Stutz, 2009; Viadero, 2009). A total of 99 schools participated in the program (Taylor et al., 2008). The Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) awards were substantial, with most schools receiving between $150 and $200 per student for each of the three years. To be eligible for the program, schools had to be in the top third of Texas schools with the respect to the share of economically disadvantaged students during the 2004-2005 school year (Taylor et al., 2008). In the year three evaluation report, the analysis results for GEEG were categorized as either weakly positive, negative, or negligible in affecting student achievement gains. According to researchers from the National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University, the GEEG program did not produce desired results (Viadero, 2009). Kouri, the president of the Texas State Teachers' Association,

stated the association was not surprised by the findings and had predicted the program would be a flop (Stutz, 2009).

Project on Incentives in Teaching in Nashville, Tennessee. Project on Incentives in Teaching, or POINT, in the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools was implemented to determine if test scores would raise if teachers were rewarded based on improved scores (Springer, Ballou, Hamilton, Le, Lockwood, McCaffrey, Pepper, & Stecher, 2010). A three-year study conducted from the 2006-2007 through the 2008-2009 school years by the National Center on Performance Incentives concluded there is no effect of incentives on test scores. Mathematics teachers in fifth through eighth grades voluntarily participated and were assigned to a control group comprised of those not eligible for bonuses or to a treatment group consisting of those eligible for bonuses. Two-thirds of the district's eligible middle school mathematics teachers volunteered, with 296 teachers participating in the study. At the end of the three-year study, only 148 teachers remained. The attrition rate was due to teachers leaving the district, switching to administrative jobs, or changing content areas. Each POINT teacher received a stipend of $750 for each year of participation in the experiment. This stipend amount was to encourage all volunteers to participate in various kinds of data-collection activities (Springer et al., 2010).

Teacher bonuses were awarded in increments of $5,000 up to $15,000 on the basis of student test-score gains on the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program (TCAP). Over the course of three years, more than $1.27 million was spent in bonuses. Sixteen teachers were one-time bonus winners, 17 were rewarded bonuses twice, and 18 received bonuses all three years. In all, 51 or 33.6 percent of the initial treatment group of 152 teachers received a bonus over the course of the experiment. The average bonuses per year ranged from $6,623 to $11,370 (Springer et al., 2010).

As the project concluded, no significant difference occurred in student achievement test scores between the treatment teacher group and the control teacher group, and there was no significant difference in any year or grade level in the study. As a result, POINT intervention did not lead to significant, lasting changes in student achievement as measured by TCAP (Springer et al., 2010).

Special Teachers Are Rewarded in Florida. The 2006-2007 budget approved by the Florida State Legislature included a $147.5 million appropriation within the Florida Education Finance Program for the Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR) performance-related pay program (Buddin, McCaffrey, Kirby, & Xia, 2007). Florida's STAR program required that all traditional public schools and public charter schools integrate a performance-related pay program into the existing salary schedule. Rewards of at least 5 percent of base pay were to be provided to a minimum of 25 percent of instructional personnel. In addition, the regulations required the State Board of Education to approve a district's STAR plan before the district could receive STAR funds. The district plan must include the following components:

- be fair and equitable without penalizing or rewarding teachers for where their students begin the school year academically;
- allow for all instructional personnel to be eligible for the reward;
- weight improved student achievement as at least 50 percent of the total evaluation score;
- be understandable and transparent;
- be designed to reward those teachers whose students show the greatest learning gains;
- be designed to reward individuals and not groups;

- utilize a district approved evaluation system with four to six levels of performance (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2007, pp. 7-12).

The STAR program faced considerable opposition from districts, teachers, and teacher unions (Buddin et al., 2007). First, the legislation was seen as a substantial intervention by the state in teacher assessments that had traditionally been the domain of the local districts. The Department of Education was seen as prescribing how districts should monitor teacher performance, without accommodating teacher or district concerns. Second, many saw the heavy emphasis on standardized student achievement gains as misplaced. Teachers were concerned the performance ranks based on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test were unreliable and evaluation methods in non-core subjects were even more deficient. Third, STAR limits on the share of teachers receiving awards were viewed as artificial. Fourth, there were concerns about the failure to recognize the contributions of teams rather than simply individuals. Given these concerns, several unions and districts were unable or unwilling to create and implement plans that satisfied STAR criteria. Without approved performance plans, districts faced the potential loss of STAR funds in the spring of 2007. The prospect of districts forgoing STAR funding created further political pressure on the program, since the legislation called for undisbursed STAR funds to be reallocated to other districts with approved STAR performance plans. This controversy led to the passage of the Merit Award Program (MAP) to replace STAR (Buddin et al., 2007).

School-Wide Performance Bonus Program in New York City. In the 2007-2008 school year, the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) implemented the School-wide Performance Bonus Program. High-needs elementary, middle, K-8, and high schools volunteered to participate in the program in order to receive financial rewards for educators (Li,

2011). To participate, 55 percent or more of the school's full-time teachers had to vote in favor of participation. In 2007-2008, 396 high-poverty schools were randomly selected to participate. Among those selected to participate, 205 schools elected to participate in the first year, 198 schools in the second, and 196 in the third and final year. Performance targets for bonus awards were defined by NYCDOE's school progress reports (growth on standardized tests and performance relative to other schools), four-year high school graduation rates, and teacher retention. A four-person compensation committee was established in each participating school to determine how to distribute the bonus awards among staff members. Teachers whose schools met their goals received bonuses of $3,000 while teachers whose schools met 75 percent of their goals received $1,500 (Fryer, 2011). In the first year, 62 percent of eligible schools received bonuses, for a total of more than $20 million. In the second year, 84 percent of eligible schools earned a bonus, for more than $30 million in awards. In the third year, after the state raised its proficiency thresholds, only 13 percent of the schools earned bonuses, for a total of $4.2 million (Li, 2011).

The district suspended the program in 2011. The program did not improve student achievement at any grade level or improve teachers' reported attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. Although teachers were generally supportive of the program, more than one third did not understand the key elements of the program. Teachers also thought the bonuses relied too heavily on test scores and the award amounts seemed insignificant after taxes (Li, 2011).

Results of ineffective pay programs. The aforementioned programs were deemed unsuccessful. In Texas, an attempt to implement a performance pay program using federal funding was ineffective. In Tennessee, an extensive program was attempted with little success, even though the program was carefully crafted and included only teacher volunteers. However,

this program did not achieve gains in student achievement. In Florida, an attempt to implement performance pay was made, but local districts and teacher representatives were not given the authority to help design the system. In New York City, a lack of understanding of the key program components was detrimental to the success of the performance pay program.

Effective Pay Programs

While there have been unsuccessful attempts to implement performance pay programs in school districts, there are a few noteworthy programs that are showing promise with implementation. These programs are showing gains in student performance and are providing individual and school bonuses.

Accelerating Student Progress, Increasing Results and Expectations in Houston, Texas. The Accelerating Student Progress, Increasing Results and Expectations (ASPIRE) program in the Houston Independent School District began in 2007 and operates in 130 of Houston's high needs campuses, all with a 50 percent or higher economically disadvantaged rate (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2010). Bonuses are paid to schools based on their test scores, as well as to individual teachers based on their students' scores (Johnson & Papay, 2009; Mellon & Radcliffe, 2008). The district also rewards teacher attendance, providing teachers an additional 10 percent of their ASPIRE bonus for perfect attendance and 5 percent if they miss fewer than 2 days (Johnson & Papay, 2009). Teachers may receive a possible total award of $10,300. Every teacher has an opportunity to earn an award regardless of whether he or she teaches core or elective subjects because school-wide results are used to determine a portion of the awards (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2010). The ASPIRE program has awarded bonuses totaling $113 million over the course of four school years (Dell Foundation, 2010). The ASPIRE program will continue to be funded by Teacher Incentive Fund

(TIF) grants, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Broad Foundation, and Micaela and Susan Dell Foundation (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2010).

Pay-for-Performance Teacher Compensation in Denver, Colorado. Denver, Colorado's Pay-for-Performance Teacher Compensation (ProComp), approved by voters in 2005, has rewarded teachers for increasing student achievement (Gonring, Teske, & Jupp, 2009). Once the Denver School District was successful in passing the annual $25 million tax increase marked for teacher salaries, teacher unions supported the program and partnered with the district to create an acceptable program. The goals of ProComp were established to:

> reward and recognize teachers for meeting and exceeding expectations, link compensation more closely with instructional outcomes for students, and enable the district to attract and retain the most qualified and effective teachers by offering uncapped annual earnings in a fair system. (Gonring et al., 2009, p. 15)

Designed by a group of teachers, administrators, and citizens, ProComp is a result of a four-year pilot and another six months of reflection. ProComp contains four components teachers can complete to earn bonuses. The components of ProComp include student growth, knowledge and skills, market incentives, and professional evaluation. Teachers are rewarded for the academic growth of their students. They can earn compensation for meeting annual objectives, for exceeding the Colorado Student Assessment Program growth goals, and for working in a school judged distinguished based on a performance metric agreed to by the district and the union. Teachers earn compensation for acquiring and demonstrating knowledge and skills by completing annual professional development units, earning additional graduate degrees and national certificates, and receiving tuition reimbursement of up to $1,000 annually. ProComp teachers also receive bonuses if they make a commitment to teach in a hard-to-serve

school and/or take a hard-to-staff assignment. The district has identified teachers of middle school math, English as a second language, special education supporting students with severe and profound needs, speech and language specialists, and school psychologists as hard-to-staff assignments. The final component of ProComp recognizes teachers who are identified as performing at satisfactory or better levels, based on observed teacher performance. Teachers receive a small salary increase the year they are evaluated if their performance is satisfactory in five areas. Because probationary teachers are evaluated annually and tenured teachers are evaluated every three years, the size of the incentive is adjusted for the frequency of the valuation period. Denver Public School teachers emphasized the success of ProComp was due to the increased district and school focus on student achievement, individual goal setting, and the professional development received in the areas of setting and measuring goals (Gonring et al., 2009).

Merit Award Program in Florida. In 2007-2008, Florida implemented the Merit Award Program (MAP). MAP is a state-wide performance pay plan that allows districts to choose to join the program with the stipulation they develop a performance pay program that fits within the MAP parameters. MAP requires performance measures for teachers in tested subjects come from objective metrics, such as student achievement on state, national, or locally produced tests. The MAP program requires districts base at least 60 percent of teacher performance measures on the performance of students assigned to the teacher or students within the teacher's school or instructional team. The state also requires districts award all of its top performing personnel with pay bonuses in the range of 5 to 10 percent of the average district salary (Florida Department of Education, 2013).

Quality Compensation for Teachers in Minnesota. In July 2005, the Minnesota State Legislature adopted Quality Compensation for Teachers or Q-Comp. The Q-Comp program is a state-wide voluntary performance pay program that rewards participating school districts with increased funding up to $260 per student. To participate in Q-Comp, the district must design and implement a plan that provides teacher bonuses that link to student performance and subjective performance evaluations (Minnesota Department of Education, 2013). In 2009, Q-Comp awarded more than $49 million in supplemental state funding to participating districts and charter schools and has awarded over $200 million since its inception. During the 2010-2011 school year, 50 of Minnesota's 333 regular school districts and 54 charter schools participated in Q-Comp (Sojourner, Mykerezi, & West, 2011). Q-Comp incorporates both traditional career ladders and professional development for teachers, while integrating additional teacher compensation based on state approved measures of student achievement (Minnesota Department of Education, 2013). The average Q-Comp plan offers teachers the opportunity to earn over $2,000 in annual bonuses if the teacher meets specific performance targets (Sojourner et al., 2011).

Results of effective pay programs. The school districts in Houston, Denver, Florida, and Minnesota have successfully created performance pay plans that are working and appear to show promise. Both opponents and proponents of performance pay programs will continue to follow these existing programs to determine their effectiveness over time. There is support for alternative methods of compensation for education personnel. This next section provides relevant information on alternatives to performance pay.

Alternatives to Performance Pay

Alternative compensation plans are based on paying teachers for work or activities completed in the school setting (Johnson & Papay, 2009). The next section of this paper will present such alternatives as minimum starting salary and added responsibilities, National Board Certification, tiered programs, multiple measures, and accomplished teaching pathways.

Minimum starting salary and added responsibilities. Although the NEA has not supported performance pay, the organization has supported a minimum starting salary of $40,000 for teachers (NEA, 2014). Pink (2009) agreed base pay for teachers needed to increase. He advocated too many talented people opt out of a career in education because they are concerned about supporting their families. Raising base salaries would remove an obstacle to entering the profession for prospective teachers. Pink (2009) further concluded "the best use of money as a motivator is to pay people enough to take the issue of money off the table, which raising base salaries would do (p. 192).

Both the NEA and the AFT agreed additional ways to compensate teachers should include paying teachers to serve as mentors to new teachers, assume additional responsibilities, or take positions in hard-to-staff buildings (AFT, 2014; NEA, 2014). Scholastic and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation distributed a national survey to over 10,000 educators in 2011. Sixteen percent of teachers felt performance pay helps retain good teachers, while 41 percent felt higher salaries are absolutely essential in retaining good teachers (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2011).

National Board Certification. National Board Certification is a demanding process that ensures Board-certified teachers have proven skills to advance student achievement (National Board for Professional Teaching Standards [NBPTS], 2013). As part of this process, teachers

voluntarily analyze their teaching, submit videos of their teaching, and provide student work samples that demonstrate growth and achievement. Candidates seeking certification must complete four portfolio entries focusing on the teaching practice and six constructed response questions to assess content knowledge. Based on national standards, National Board Certification has five core propositions forming the foundation for accomplished teachers:

1. Teachers are committed to students and their learning.
2. Teachers know the subjects they teach and how to teach those subjects to students.
3. Teachers are responsible for managing and monitoring student learning.
4. Teachers think systematically about their practice and learn from experience.
5. Teachers are members of learning communities (p. v).

Incentive pay for National Board Certification varies from state to state and district to district. According to the NBPTS (2013), the incentive pay ranges from $0 per year to $10,000 per year for the life of the certificate of ten years. In Missouri, incentive pay ranges from 10 percent of the base pay up to $5,000 as determined by the local district board of education. Both the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA) strongly support National Board Certification as a proven way to strengthen the skills, knowledge, professionalism, and recognition of teachers (AFT, 2014; NEA, 2014).

Tiered programs. Johnson and Papay (2009) proposed a tiered system similar to the career ladder programs of the 1980s. Missouri's career ladder program began in 1985 and was funded jointly by the state and participating districts until the 2010-2011 school year (Missouri State Teachers Association, 2010). Participating districts were required to provide matching funds, ranging from 40 to 60 percent of funds. More than 17,000 teachers from 333 districts participated in the career ladder program during the 2005-2006 school year. The career ladder

Program used multiple performance indicators—teacher performance, tenure, and extra responsibilities—to determine teacher eligibility for salary supplements. Teacher performance was evaluated by a district career ladder review committee that reviewed observation reports, lesson plans, and evidence of proficiency on 20 criteria from the district's Performance-Based Teacher Evaluation instrument. Stage 1 teachers could earn up to $1,500 per year, while those in the second and third stages could earn up to $3,000 and $5,000 per year, respectively (Booker & Glazerman, 2008). Booker and Glazerman analyzed nine years of student test results from the state's math and reading assessments in the 524 school districts nationwide. Booker and Glazerman found Missouri's career ladder program had limited effect on student test scores. While they did uncover a positive association between a district's participation in the program and its average test results at three grade levels, the estimates were small for math scores and not statistically significant for reading scores (Booker & Glazerman, 2008).

Johnson and Papay's (2009) system has four tiers to classify teachers' pay based on expertise, effectiveness, and the roles they assume outside the classroom. Each of the four tiers of the pay structure would include several steps to reward loyalty and encourage retention. Teachers would advance one step annually within that tier as long as they received satisfactory performance evaluations and continued to demonstrate success with their students. Teachers advance through the tiers over the course of their career:

- The first tier consists of beginning teachers. Beginning teachers remain in the first tier until achieving tenure or being released from their contract.
- The second tier consists of tenured teachers. Teachers could remain on this tier for the rest of their careers. Salaries would increase as a result of cost-of-living

allowances or across-the-board raises, or be supplemented with other incentives or awards that the district might offer.

- The third tier consists of master teachers or teacher leaders. These teachers have demonstrated success with students, understanding of the pedagogy, and shown a commitment to colleagues' learning. Additional responsibilities these individuals might assume include opening their classroom doors to less-skilled teachers for observation, or serve as models and advisors to other staff. These teachers could also take on other kinds of leadership roles.
- The fourth tier consists of highly effective teachers. To reach this tier, teachers have to demonstrate high levels of effectiveness. Teachers on this tier could work with new teachers, implement new curriculum, or coach other teachers (Johnson & Papay, 2009, p. 55).

Johnson and Papay (2009) agreed local school districts would have to create their own tier systems based on the districts' desired outcomes. This pay structure would maintain several of the key advantages of the single salary schedule, continuing to provide stable and predictable salaries for teachers. However, teachers who demonstrated strong performance and sought to influence their schools more broadly would be rewarded for their initiative and success (Johnson & Papay, 2009).

Multiple measures. One of the key opposing points to performance pay programs is linking compensation to one test score. One of performance pay's key supporters, Education Secretary Arnie Duncan, stated test scores alone should never drive teacher evaluation, compensation, or tenure decisions (Gratz, 2009). Brookhart (2009) defines multiple measures as "using different methods to monitor student progress and achievement" (p. 7). Using multiple

measures allows for construct validity and decision validity. Construct validity is "the degree to which any score conveys meaningful information about the attribute it measures" (Brookhart, 2009, p. 7). Decision validity is improved due to several relevant types of information, each of which could have one or more measures. By using both methods, a more accurate picture of student ability and achievement can be created. Multiple measures result in meaningful, useful decisions (Brookhart, 2009).

According to Gratz (2009), many assume standardized test scores accurately measure student achievement; however, critical thinking skills, problem solving, and teamwork are key skills that indicate success in the workplace. These skills cannot be measured on a standardized test, yet schools must include these skills to build well-rounded students (Gratz, 2009). Many districts have opted to use multiple-measure teacher evaluation models that look at student achievement data, but also take into account additional sources, such as classroom observations and student/parent perceptions (Hanover Research, 2012). According to Hanover Research (2012) "multiple-measure evaluations carry significant benefits in the way of accuracy, with increased validity of observations and reliability of feedback being cited as advantages. However, multiple-measure evaluations can also require a significant commitment of time and resources" (p. 2). In *Teacher Evaluation: A Comprehensive Guide to New Directions and Practices*, author Kenneth Peterson recommends "using multiple data sources to inform judgments about teacher quality. The following types of data should be used: student reports, peer review of materials, student achievement, teacher tests, parent reports, documentation of professional activity, systematic observation, and administrator reports" (Hanover Research, 2012, p. 7).

Accomplished Teaching Pathways. Accomplished Teaching Pathways (A-PATH) is a compensation program that focuses on improving student achievement while rewarding the educator. According to the Educator Compensation Institute (2009) A-PATH has four main objectives: "to attract highly-talented people into the profession of teaching, to retain that talent, to improve teaching skills and knowledge, and to add to the collective body of knowledge about effective teaching practices." (p. 2)

A-PATH resembles a tiered program in which a teacher can progress through levels as requirements are met. The Residency stage is designed for first-year teachers with a duration of one year. During Residency, classroom teachers will be assigned a 50 percent teaching case load and the remainder of time is spent modeling, reflecting, and working with mentors and master educators. Salary at this stage starts at $35,000 and transition to the Initial Educator stage is achieved upon the recommendation of the building principal at the end of year one. After Residency, teachers move into the Initial Educator stage. Teachers may remain at the Initial Educator stage for up to four years by completing a portfolio consisting of evidence of professional growth in the area of teaching standards, creating a professional development plan, demonstrating collaboration with colleagues, and developing an assessment plan to improve student learning. The salary increases to $50,000 at this step. The Professional Educator stage is where teachers can remain for the duration of their career, assuming the successful completion of a portfolio every five years. The Professional Educator salary ranges from $60,000 to $65,000. The final stage, Master Educator, requires teachers to obtain National Board Certification. Teachers who reach the Master Educator stage can earn $75,000 to $80,000 each year (Educator Compensation Institute, 2009).

For teachers to earn additional compensation, A-PATH encourages professional development in district sponsored workshops, university course work, evidence of collaboration with colleagues, or action research. Supplementary pay can further be earned by serving as teacher leaders or working in hard-to-serve schools (Educator Compensation Institute, 2009). In 2011 Iowa revealed a tiered system that closely resembles A-PATH. Iowa's proposed program "removes the single salary schedule in favor of a system of apprentice, career, mentor, and master teachers" (para. 1). Under the proposal, teachers would start as apprentice teachers at $40,000 per year and serve as apprentices until they reach career teacher status. At that point, they would be compensated about $50,000 a year. Career teachers could then become mentor teachers or master teachers with additional responsibilities, but the number of mentor or master teachers would be limited to about 25 percent of a district's teachers (Educator Compensation Institute, 2011).

Conclusion

Given the need to improve our nation's schools, it is only right that teacher compensation has reached the top of the research agenda. Lately, teacher pay reform is often in the news, as states, localities, and the federal government start not only considering but actually implementing various pay reform programs. Florida, Minnesota, and Texas have all embarked on high-profile compensation reform efforts that include performance pay as a central component. These states are joined by urban school systems in Denver, Houston, and New York City that have launched reform initiatives. The federal government is providing additional encouragement with its Teacher Incentive Fund, which provides grants to states or localities for development of alternatives to the single salary schedule (Springer, 2009). The challenge must be to provide all children with public schools that have excellent teachers and strong, supportive leaders.

According to the AFT (2014), “a system that invests in teachers’ growth, gives them the tools and conditions that improve teaching and learning, and builds teaching into a respected profession is required” (para. 3).

Research has shown teacher quality influences student achievement (Danielson, 2009; Marzano, 2007; Schmoker, 2006). Nearly half of all new teachers leave the profession within the first five years (NEA, 2014; Gratz, 2009). As changes have occurred in the economic situation of districts, there are reasons to doubt the efficacy and effectiveness of the traditional salary schedule (Albright, 2011). While the issue of teacher compensation continues to be examined, the bottom line remains: education systems must attract and retain highly-qualified teachers and provide fair, equitable wages (Johnson & Papay, 2009).

Chapter Three presents the methodology, participants, survey instrument, pilot process, and guidelines involved in this quantitative study. Chapter Four will provide the findings of the study with an analysis of the results and possibilities for future research to follow in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Performance pay has become a topic of discussion as educational issues are considered by stakeholders. Over 96 percent of school districts across the nation utilize a traditional salary schedule, rewarding educators with years of experience and educational attainment; however, there are reasons the system is outdated and inefficient (Gratz, 2009). This descriptive, quantitative research design will provide a description of the perceptions of educators in Missouri school systems regarding performance pay. With this information, school leaders may be better equipped with the knowledge necessary to successfully determine if a performance pay plan would be an effective method for compensating teachers.

Participants

The purpose of the survey was to gather data to examine the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward a performance pay system. This study was conducted in public schools across the state of Missouri. Missouri is a state with 524 school districts, and all teachers, administrators, and superintendents employed in the selected districts were invited to participate in this study. For this survey, a stratified random sample of small, medium, and large K-12 Missouri public school districts was used. Small school districts were considered those with a population of less than 1,000 students. Medium school districts were those with a population of 1,000 to 4,000 students, while large school districts have a population of more than 4,000 students. Stratified random sampling is a selection of subjects to guarantee representation of relevant subgroups in the population (i.e., strata) in numbers proportional to their presence in the population. Identification of all members

of the population can be difficult as may be the identification of members of all subgroups. Selection issues include identification of relevant strata, coding subjects regarding strata and selecting randomly from within each level of the strata. Identified subgroups should be randomly selected for inclusion. Random stratified selection improves the representativeness of the sample by reducing sampling error. It can produce a weighted mean that has less variability than the arithmetic mean of a simple random sample of the population (Perry, 2014).

There are two main strategies of stratified random sampling. The first is proportional allocation, where a sampling fraction in each group is used that is proportionate to the total population. The second is optimum allocation, during which each group is proportionate to the standard deviation off the variable's distribution. Both help ensure the results have the least possible sampling variance possible. The proportional stratified random sampling meets the needs for a representative sample of the population (Perry, 2014).

Proportionate allocation uses a sampling fraction in each of the strata that is proportional to that of the total population. For instance, if the population *X* consists of *s* in the small school stratum and m in the medium stratum and o (where s + *m* + o = *X*), then the relative size of the three samples (*x1 = s/X* small, *x2* = m*/X* medium, x3 = o/X) should reflect this proportion. Generally each stratum is taken in proportion to the size of the stratum (Perry, 2014).

Example:

The researcher has created strata for small schools (s), medium schools (m), and large (o) schools the researcher also has chosen to utilize a cluster sample to ensure a comparable sample is selected in each of the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education supervisor regions (Perry, 2014).

Supervisor Regions

A St. Louis (Excluded)

B Kansas City (Excluded)

C (*x1* = *s/X* small, *x2* = m/*X* medium, x3 = o/X)

D (*x1* = *s/X* small, *x2* = m/*X* medium, x3 = o/X)

E (*x1* = *s/X* small, *x2* = m/*X* medium, x3 = o/X)

F (*x1* = *s/X* small, *x2* = m/*X* medium, x3 = o/X)

G (*x1* = *s/X* small, *x2* = m/*X* medium, x3 = o/X)

H (*x1* = *s/X* small, *x2* = m/*X* medium, x3 = o/X)

I (*x1* = *s/X* small, *x2* = m/*X* medium, x3 = o/X)

Region C has 59 out of 330 total small school districts in the state, which is 18 percent of the total number of small school districts in the population. As a result, 11 small school districts in region C were randomly selected and surveyed. Region C has 24 out of 96 total medium school districts in the state, which is 25 percent of the total number of medium schools in the population. As a result, 6 medium school districts in region C were randomly selected and surveyed. Region C has 11 out of 23 total large school districts in the state, which is 48 percent of the total number of large school districts in the population. As a result, 5 large school districts in region C were randomly selected and surveyed.

Region D has 36 out of 330 total small school districts in the state, which is 11 percent of the total number of small school districts in the population. As a result, 4 small school districts in region D were randomly selected and surveyed. Region D has 17 out of 96 total medium school districts in the state, which is 18 percent of the total number of medium schools in the population. As a result, 3 medium school districts in region D were randomly selected and

surveyed. Region D has 4 out of 23 total large school districts in the state, which is 17 percent of the total number of large school districts in the population. As a result, 1 large school district in region D was randomly selected and surveyed.

Region E has 45 out of 330 total small school districts in the state, which is 14 percent of the total number of small school districts in the population. As a result, 6 small school districts in region E were randomly selected and surveyed. Region E has 17 out of 96 total medium school districts in the state, which is 18 percent of the total number of medium schools in the population. As a result, 3 medium school districts in region E were randomly selected and surveyed. Region E has 3 out of 23 total large school districts in the state, which is 13 percent of the total number of large school districts in the population. As a result, 0 large school districts in region E were randomly selected and surveyed.

Region F has 49 out of 330 total small school districts in the state, which is 15 percent of the total number of small school districts in the population. As a result, 7 small school districts in region F were randomly selected and surveyed. Region F has 11 out of 96 total medium school districts in the state, which is 11 percent of the total number of medium schools in the population. As a result, 1 medium school district in region F was randomly selected and surveyed. Region F has 1 out of 23 total large school districts in the state, which is 1 percent of the total number of large school districts in the population. As a result, 0 large school districts in region F were randomly selected and surveyed.

Region G has 46 out of 330 total small school districts in the state, which is 14 percent of the total number of small school districts in the population. As a result, 6 small school districts in region G were randomly selected and surveyed. Region G has 14 out of 96 total medium school districts in the state, which is 15 percent of the total number of medium schools in the

population. As a result, 2 medium school districts in region G were randomly selected and surveyed. Region G has 3 out of 23 total large school districts in the state, which is 13 percent of the total number of large school districts in the population. As a result, 0 large school districts in region G were randomly selected and surveyed.

Region H has 53 out of 330 total small school districts in the state, which is 16 percent of the total number of small school districts in the population. As a result, 8 small school districts in region H were randomly selected and surveyed. Region H has 5 out of 96 total medium school districts in the state, which is 5 percent of the total number of medium schools in the population. As a result, 0 medium school districts in region H were randomly selected and surveyed. Region H has 1 out of 23 total large school districts in the state, which is 4 percent of the total number of large school districts in the population. As a result, 0 large school districts in region H were randomly selected and surveyed.

Region I has 42 out of 330 total small school districts in the state, which is 12 percent of the total number of small school districts in the population. As a result, 5 small school districts in region I were randomly selected and surveyed. Region I has 8 out of 96 total medium school districts in the state, which is 8 percent of the total number of medium schools in the population. As a result, 1 medium school district in region I was randomly selected and surveyed. Region I has 0 out of 23 total large school districts in the state, which is 0 percent of the total number of large school districts in the population. As a result, 0 large school districts in region I were randomly selected and surveyed. A total of 47 small, 16 medium, and 6 large school districts were randomly selected and surveyed.

The survey, informed email consent, ethics certificate, and Research Review Board (RRB) application were sent to the RRB electronically and as a paper copy with the appropriate

signatures in February 2014 for approval. The submitted forms outlined participant consent, confidentiality, the ability to withdraw at any time without penalty, lack of any foreseen harm to respondents, and a brief overview of the study's purpose. The researcher obtained a master email list of Missouri public schools superintendents and administrators from the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. Administrators were then asked to forward the survey to teachers. A window of three weeks was allowed for participants to complete the survey. A follow-up email was sent one week after the initial email as a reminder to those who had yet to complete the survey, as well as a thank you to those that had completed it. If subjects declined to participate, or did not take any action, by the end of the second week there was no further communication.

Survey Rationale and Construction

The survey used in this study consisted of four scales: Impact on Student Achievement, Teacher Evaluation, Recruitment and Retention of Teachers, and Effect on School Climate. The first scale, Impact on Student Achievement, was designed to gain insight on perceptions of how performance pay would impact student achievement. Research shows performance pay has the potential to impact student achievement. The second scale, Teacher Evaluation, was designed to determine perceptions of how performance pay should be tied teacher evaluation. Missouri's new teacher evaluation model ties teacher evaluation to student achievement and necessitates the need to look at tying performance pay to teacher evaluation. The third scale, Recruitment and Retention of Teachers, was intended to measure the perceptions of how performance pay may affect the recruitment and retention of teachers. The fourth scale, Effect on School Climate, was designed to measure perceptions on how implementing a performance pay system may affect school climate. The demographic data allowed separation of the various populations and

comparison of groups; for example, teachers and administrators. To increase reliability, the survey consisted of questions stated in the positive as well as reversed questions to ensure respondents were giving consistent responses as opposed to marking responses without scrutiny.

Survey Development

Survey questions were developed based on knowledge gained from the literature review. After the questions were generated from a table of specifications (see Table 1), the survey instrument was entered into the Question Pro system available through Southwest Baptist University at no cost. The table of specifications was utilized to address face validity, the extent to which the survey questions were subjectively viewed as aligning to its intended scale. The table of specifications determined the survey questions looked like they were going to measure what they were supposed to measure.

Table 1: Table of Specifications

Survey Statements	Student Achievement	Teacher Evaluation	Recruitment and Retention	School Climate
1. I would work for performance pay if it was based on the test scores of students in my classroom.	X			
2. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to building-wide student performance criteria.	X			
3. Performance pay should be tied to district test scores on state achievement tests (MAP, TerraNova, EOC Exams).	X			
4. I believe teachers performing at higher levels should be rewarded differently than teachers performing at lower levels.	X			
5. My district should not implement a performance pay plan based on student achievement.	X			

6. Teacher performance pay would provide an incentive for teachers to work harder toward improving student achievement on standardized tests.	X	
7. Teachers who increase student achievement should receive a bonus through performance pay.	X	
8. Gains in student test scores are appropriate measures of teacher effectiveness.	X	
9. Performance pay would increase achievement in my school.	X	
10. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to the performance of students in my classroom (individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, etc).	X	
11. Performance pay should be tied to student evaluations of teachers.		X
12. Performance pay should be tied to parent evaluations of teachers.		X
13. Performance pay should be tied to principal evaluations of teachers.		X
14. My administrators do not evaluate teachers enough to make an accurate decision on whether or not a teacher should receive performance pay.		X
15. An end-of-year evaluation by the principal is an appropriate measure of my effectiveness to make an accurate decision on whether or not I should receive performance pay.		X
16. Teachers whose performance exceed a school district's expectations as documented by performance evaluations, should receive performance pay.		X

17. Evaluations by administrators are an adequate measure to qualify for performance pay.	X			
18. Performance pay will cause favoritism among administrators, rewarding those who don't "rock the boat."	X			
19. It is fair to hold teachers accountable and base their pay on student achievement.	X			
20. Performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance.	X			
21. Performance pay would aid in the recruitment of highly-qualified teachers.			X	
22. Performance pay would help retain highly-qualified teachers.			X	
23. Performance pay will encourage good teachers to stay in a school district.			X	
24. Performance pay would make working at a district more attractive.			X	
25. Districts that offer performance pay would have more highly-qualified teachers apply for positions.			X	
26. Performance pay would encourage highly-qualified teachers to remain in a district.			X	
27. Districts that offer performance pay would appeal to teachers.			X	
28. Performance pay would deter highly-qualified teachers from applying for available positions.			X	
29. Performance pay will negatively impact the recruiting of future educators.			X	
30. Performance pay will negatively impact the retention of highly-qualified teachers.			X	
31. Performance pay would foster a climate of collaboration among teachers.				X

32. Performance pay would improve the morale among the staff in my district.		X
33. If performance pay were implemented, teachers would become competitive with one another.		X
34. Performance pay would create better relationships among staff members.		X
35. Performance pay would improve school climate.		X
36. Teachers' workloads would increase as a result of the implementation of teacher performance pay.		X
37. The possibility of a bonus would motivate me to work toward the goals.		X
38. Performance pay would encourage teachers to help each other develop their knowledge and skills.		X
39. Teachers who received more performance pay would be resented by those who did not receive as much.		X
40. Performance pay would reduce the sense of community among teachers.		X

Pilot Process

A number of pilot surveys were administered to experts in the education field. The results of these pilot surveys were utilized to revise and improve the survey tool. The pilot process consisted of the following steps:

1. Expert Validity Pilot #1: The expert validity pilot was utilized to address content validity, the alignment of the survey questions and the scale they are intended to assess. The researcher used the first version of the survey instrument as presented in Appendix A to garner feedback from experts in the fields of teacher performance pay

and survey instruments. Those experts were an elementary principal, a middle school principal, a superintendent, a university professor, and a Department of Elementary and Secondary Education Area Supervisor. These experts were given the task of rating the degree to which each survey item aligns to the scales that were defined by the researcher. An Index of Item-Objective Congruency, developed by Rovinelli and Hambleton (1977), was performed. A scale of -1, 0, and 1 was used. A score of -1 indicated the question did not align with the scale's objectives, 0 was neutral, and 1 signified the question was aligned with the scale. Feedback from the experts was used to further revise and improve the survey instrument. The survey was sent to these five experts on Saturday, April 5, 2014, and all five had completed the survey as of Wednesday, April 9, 2014. The researcher had conversations by telephone or email with all 5 experts to further revise intended responses on the item-objective congruency survey. Table 2 below represents the Rovinelli and Hambleton's index aggregate results for each question of the survey. A value of 1 is the highest possible value with each of the five respondents indicating a 1, the statement highly matches the intended scale. Ideally, values should be .60 or higher. Statements 1, 4, 5, 6, 18, and 36 had values below 0.60. As a result, the wording of five of the statements was modified and one question was removed.

Table 2: Index of Item-Objective Congruency

Survey Statements	Index
1. I would work for performance pay if it was based on the test scores of students in my classroom.	0.40
2. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to building-wide student performance criteria.	0.60
3. Performance pay should be tied to district test scores on state achievement tests (MAP, TerraNova, EOC Exams).	0.60
4. I believe teachers performing at higher levels should be rewarded differently than teachers performing at lower levels.	0.20

5. My district should not implement a performance pay plan based on student achievement.	0.40
6. Teacher performance pay would provide an incentive for teachers to work harder toward improving student achievement on standardized tests.	0.40
7. Teachers who increase student achievement should receive a bonus through performance pay.	0.60
8. Gains in student test scores are appropriate measures of teacher effectiveness.	0.80
9. Performance pay would increase achievement in my school.	0.60
10. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to the performance of students in my classroom (individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, etc).	0.60
11. Performance pay should be tied to student evaluations of teachers.	0.60
12. Performance pay should be tied to parent evaluations of teachers.	0.60
13. Performance pay should be tied to principal evaluations of teachers.	1.00
14. My administrators do not evaluate teachers enough to make an accurate decision on whether or not a teacher should receive performance pay.	0.60
15. An end-of-year evaluation by the principal is an appropriate measure of my effectiveness to make an accurate decision on whether or not I should receive performance pay.	0.60
16. Teachers whose performance exceed a school district's expectations as documented by performance evaluations, should receive performance pay.	0.60
17. Evaluations by administrators are an adequate measure to qualify for performance pay.	0.60
18. Performance pay will cause favoritism among administrators, rewarding those who don't "rock the boat."	0.00
19. It is fair to hold teachers accountable and base their pay on student achievement.	0.60
20. Performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance.	0.60
21. Performance pay would aid in the recruitment of highly-qualified teachers.	0.80
22. Performance pay would help retain highly-qualified teachers.	1.00
23. Performance pay will encourage good teachers to stay in a school district.	1.00
24. Performance pay would make working at a district more attractive.	0.60
25. Districts that offer performance pay would have more highly-qualified teachers apply for positions.	0.60
26. Performance pay would encourage highly-qualified teachers to remain in a district.	1.00
27. Districts that offer performance pay would appeal to teachers.	0.60
28. Performance pay would deter highly-qualified teachers from applying for available positions.	0.60

29. Performance pay will negatively impact the recruiting of future educators.	0.60
30. Performance pay will negatively impact the retention of highly-qualified teachers.	0.80
31. Performance pay would foster a climate of collaboration among teachers.	0.80
32. Performance pay would improve the morale among the staff in my district.	0.80
33. If performance pay were implemented, teachers would become competitive with one another.	0.80
34. Performance pay would create better relationships among staff members.	0.80
35. Performance pay would improve school climate.	0.80
36. Teachers' workloads would increase as a result of the implementation of teacher performance pay.	0.40
37. The possibility of a bonus would motivate me to work toward the goals.	0.80
38. Performance pay would encourage teachers to help each other develop their knowledge and skills.	0.60
39. Teachers who received more performance pay would be resented by those who did not receive as much.	1.00
40. Performance pay would reduce the sense of community among teachers.	1.00

2. Validity Pre-Pilot: The researcher observed five colleagues taking the pilot and had conversations regarding the ease of taking the survey, problematic questions, suggested revisions, and other questions aimed at improving the survey. These colleagues' input was taken into account and used to revise the survey before sending the survey out to the validity pilot.
3. Validity Pilot: The survey was sent as a pilot to 48 teachers, administrators, and superintendents. To represent a cross-section of the study's potential population, participants were randomly selected from small, medium, and large school districts. The pilot survey results were then uploaded to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to perform a factor analysis to determine construct validity, the degree to which the questions distinctly address the four scales. Using .300 (+ and -) as a baseline, those questions well below the .300 mark were removed from the

survey. Question 39 was close to the .300 threshold and small changes were made in order to use the questions in the final survey. Questions 6, 9, 32 and 34 were well below the .300 threshold; therefore, questions 6 and 9 were redrafted while questions 32 and 34 were removed from the final survey. After the factor analysis, 37 questions remained for the final survey. It is important to note some pilot participants frequently placed items that were developed for the Evaluation or Achievement scales on the three other scales, which was not typical of the statements that were theorized to measure the other scales. This caused some of the index values to lower. The decision was made to proceed with the four scales, so further analysis could be completed. Table 3 below represents the factor analysis performed to determine statement loading per scale.

Table 3: Validity Pilot Factor Analysis

Survey Statements	Recruitment and Retention	School Climate	Student Achievement	Teacher Evaluation
1. Performance pay would increase achievement in my school.	.749	.113	**.283**	.301
2. Performance pay would aid in the recruitment of highly-qualified teachers.	**.818**	.143	-.038	.260
3. Performance pay would encourage teachers to help each other develop their knowledge and skills.	.342	**.420**	.219	.183
4. Teachers whose performance exceed a school district's expectations as documented by performance evaluations should receive performance pay.	.594	.055	.531	**.249**
5. Teacher performance pay would provide an incentive for teachers to improve student achievement on standardized tests.	.730	.212	**.342**	.077
6. Performance pay would reduce the sense of community among teachers.	-.090	**.104**	.212	-.766

7. Districts that offer performance pay would appeal to teachers.	**.609**	.272	.145	.034
8. Performance pay should be tied to the standardized test scores of students in a teacher's classroom.	.397	.144	**.753**	-.031
9. Performance pay should be tied to student evaluations of teachers.	.180	.492	.561	**.022**
10. Teachers who received more performance pay would be resented by those who did not receive as much.	-.116	**-.650**	.076	.297
11. Performance pay would encourage highly-qualified teachers to remain in a district.	**.984**	.096	.028	.181
12. Teachers who increase student achievement should receive a bonus through performance pay.	.714	-.032	**.289**	-.122
13. My administrators do not evaluate teachers enough to make an accurate decision on whether or not a teacher should receive performance pay.	-.266	.206	.257	**.567**
14. Performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance.	.491	-.098	.358	**.249**
15. Performance pay should be tied to principal evaluations of teachers.	.362	.287	.610	**.424**
16. Performance pay should be tied to building-wide student performance criteria.	.421	.204	**.367**	.072
17. Performance pay would foster a climate of collaboration among teachers.	.129	**.775**	.169	.086
18. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to the performance of students in my classroom (individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, etc.),	.575	.346	**.298**	-.101
19. Evaluations by administrators are an adequate measure to qualify for performance pay.	-.164	.075	-.221	**-.707**
20. Performance pay would improve school climate.	.316	**.638**	.143	.386
21. Gains in student test scores are appropriate measures of teacher effectiveness.	.213	-.073	**.605**	.275

22. Performance pay will encourage good teachers to stay in a school district.	**.758**	.273	.248	.176
23. Performance pay has the potential of influencing administrators' evaluations of teachers.	-.016	-.359	-.226	**-.417**
24. Performance pay will negatively impact the retention of highly-qualified teachers.	**.602**	.428	.218	-.024
25. Performance pay would make working in a district more attractive.	**.591**	.434	.372	-.219
26. Performance pay would improve the morale among the staff in my district.	.238	**.846**	.080	.108
27. Performance pay should be tied to district test scores on state achievement tests (MAP, TerraNova, EOC exams).	.256	.251	**.667**	.147
28. Performance pay would help retain highly-qualified teachers.	**.706**	.322	.175	.313
29. Performance pay would create better relationships among staff members.	.212	**.780**	.200	.173
30. Performance pay will negatively impact the recruiting of future educators.	**.462**	.559	.305	-.177
31. An end-of-year evaluation by the principal is an appropriate measure of my effectiveness to make an accurate decision on whether or not I should receive performance pay.	.205	.152	.510	**.536**
32. The possibility of a bonus would motivate me to work toward the goals.	.674	**.143**	.323	-.228
33. Districts that offer performance pay would have more highly-qualified teachers apply for positions.	**.763**	.225	.291	.068
34. Performance pay should be tied to parent evaluations of teachers.	.172	.487	.639	**-.074**
35. If performance pay were implemented, teachers would become competitive with one another.	.064	**-.666**	.092	.065

36. Performance pay would deter highly-qualified teachers from applying for available positions.	**.550**	.441	.184	-.328
37. The implementation of performance-based pay for teachers would increase student performance on standardized tests.	.280	.375	**.415**	.393
38. Teacher performance pay would negatively affect school climate.	.362	**.693**	-.038	.159
39. It is fair to hold teachers accountable and base their pay on student achievement.	.347	-.004	.487	**.212**

Note. Bolded values represent those with a value of .300 or higher indicating they load on that particular scale. Items with similar load values or insignificant differences were not bolded.

4. Cronbach's Alpha: Using the final 48-person pilot and the four final scales, Cronbach's Alpha was determined through SPSS for internal consistency and reliability. The alpha value for the Student Achievement scale was 0.90. For the Teacher Evaluation scale, the alpha value was 0.63. The Recruitment and Retention scale had an alpha value of 0.93, while the Climate scale had an alpha value of 0.63. The Student Achievement and Recruitment and Retention scales had values that were very strong, indicating a strong reliability for these two scales. The Teacher Evaluation and Climate scales did not have as high an internal consistency as desired. However, the scales were still usable for the purpose of this study and showed promise to hold for the survey process.

Procedure

After the pilot surveys were completed and necessary revisions were made, the final version of the survey instrument was emailed to superintendents and administrators in Missouri public schools. Administrators then forwarded the survey instrument to their teachers. Email addresses of the superintendents and administrators were obtained through the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) information system. The survey was open for

approximately three weeks. The RRB approved informed consent presented in Appendix B was included in the original email. To obtain a higher return rate, principals were reminded two times via email to take the survey, as well as send it to their staff. A factor analysis was performed on the final results from the 37-question survey to determine validity. Table 4 shows the factor analysis values for the final survey results. Questions 4, 14, and 23 were removed from the final results analysis. These questions will need to be tested further due to 209 responses instead of the desired 400 responses.

Table 4: Final Survey Factor Analysis

Survey Statements	Recruitment and Retention	School Climate	Student Achievement	Teacher Evaluation
1. Performance pay would increase achievement in my school.	.467	.159	**.631**	.235
2. Performance pay would aid in the recruitment of highly-qualified teachers.	**.477**	.151	**.594**	.151
3. Performance pay would encourage teachers to help each other develop their knowledge and skills.	.131	**.497**	**.563**	.129
4. Teachers whose performance exceed a school district's expectations as documented by performance evaluations should receive performance pay.	.471	.045	**.547**	.140
5. Teacher performance pay would provide an incentive for teachers to improve student achievement on standardized tests.	.182	.003	**.709**	.082
6. Performance pay would reduce the sense of collaboration among teachers.	.131	**.712**	.045	-.065
7. Districts that offer performance pay would appeal to teachers.	**.571**	.191	**.545**	.179
8. Performance pay should be tied to the standardized test scores of students in a teacher's classroom.	.083	.273	**.698**	.219
9. Performance pay should be based on administrator evaluations of teachers.	.390	.043	.244	**.754**

10. Teachers who received more performance pay would be resented by those who did not receive as much.	-.221	**-.646**	-.068	-.224
11. Performance pay would encourage highly-qualified teachers to remain in a district.	**.588**	.057	.479	.376
12. Teachers who increase student achievement should receive a bonus through performance pay.	**.524**	-.008	**.492**	.240
13. My administrators do not evaluate teachers enough to make an accurate decision on whether or not a teacher should receive performance pay.	.038	.231	.047	**.334**
14. Performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance.	**.538**	.149	**.562**	.341
15. Performance pay should be tied to principal evaluations of teachers.	.372	.117	.290	**.770**
16. Performance pay should be tied to building-wide student performance criteria.	.230	-.069	**.553**	.425
17. Performance pay would foster a climate of collaboration among teachers.	.201	**.620**	.439	.218
18. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to the performance of students in my classroom (individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, etc.),	.420	-.069	**.620**	.133
19. Evaluations by administrators are an adequate measure to qualify for performance pay.	.174	.154	.321	**.801**
20. Performance pay would improve school climate.	.352	**.537**	.514	.212
21. Gains in student test scores are appropriate measures of teacher effectiveness.	.091	.120	**.713**	.152
22. Performance pay will encourage good teachers to stay in a school district.	**.559**	.110	**.578**	.323
23. Performance pay has the potential of influencing administrators' evaluations of teachers.	.219	.457	-.005	**-.258**

24. Performance pay would negatively impact the retention of highly-qualified teachers.	**.679**	.268	.226	.213
25. Performance pay would make working in a district more attractive.	**.637**	.180	.552	.225
26. Performance pay would improve the morale among the staff in my district.	.313	**.446**	**.482**	.202
27. Performance pay should be tied to district test scores on state achievement tests (MAP, TerraNova, EOC exams).	.123	.166	**.697**	.331
28. Performance pay would help retain highly-qualified teachers.	**.613**	.160	.590	.269
29. Performance pay would create better relationships among staff members.	.197	**.556**	.442	.270
30. Performance pay will negatively impact the recruiting of future educators.	**.736**	.301	.226	.089
31. An end-of-year evaluation by the principal is an appropriate measure of my effectiveness to make an accurate decision on whether or not I should receive performance pay.	.144	.111	.273	**.763**
32. Districts that offer performance pay would have more highly-qualified teachers apply for positions.	**.609**	.173	.597	.228
33. If performance pay were implemented, teachers would become competitive with one another.	-.126	**-.647**	.098	.084
34. Performance pay would deter highly-qualified teachers from applying for available positions.	**.784**	.285	.089	.128
35. The implementation of performance-based pay for teachers would increase student performance on standardized tests.	.383	.065	**.688**	.154
36. Teacher performance pay would negatively affect school climate.	.438	**.593**	.223	.168

37. It is fair to evaluate teachers based on student achievement.	.194	.126	**.728**	.114

Note. Bolded values represent those with a value of close to .600 or higher indicating they load on that particular scale. Items with similar load values were bolded to show they could load on either scale.

Cronbach's Alpha was determined through SPSS for internal consistency and reliability. The alpha value for the Student Achievement scale was 0.91. For the Teacher Evaluation scale, the alpha value was 0.82. The Recruitment and Retention scale had an alpha value of 0.95, while the Climate scale had an alpha value of 0.68. All four scales had values that were strong and usable for the purpose of this study.

Utilizing SPSS, analysis was conducted to determine if a relationship exists between the four dependent variables of performance pay and the six independent variables of gender, years of experience in education, current role, primary role, association affiliation (teachers), and district size (based on student population). Categorizing the questions from the survey created the dependent variables of recruitment and retention, school climate, student achievement, and teacher evaluation. Combining questions 2, 7, 11, 22, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32, and 34 of the survey created the first dependent variable, recruitment and retention of teachers. Combining questions 3, 6, 10, 17, 20, 26, 29, 33, 36 of the survey created the second dependent variable, school climate. Combining questions 1, 5, 8, 12, 16, 18, 21, 27, 35, and 37 created the third dependent variable, student achievement. Combining questions 9, 13, 15, 19, and 31 created the fourth dependent variable, teacher evaluation. To assess whether females and males were statistically different from each other, a *t*-test was conducted for the dependent variables and gender. A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted for the dependent variables and the remaining five independent variables. Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) was conducted after the ANOVA tests in order to determine which demographic groups differed from each other.

Conclusion

After reviewing literature about teacher performance pay, a survey questionnaire was created, distributed, and analyzed to determine teacher, administrator, and superintendent perceptions of teacher performance pay. With the in-depth pilot process, the resulting survey instrument is a reliable and valid tool to be used by school leaders and policymakers. Along with the development of a quality survey instrument, the results of this study will provide data for school and state leaders to discuss the implementation of teacher performance pay in the state of Missouri. Chapter Four will present the data and information that resulted from answering the research questions in narrative and table form. Chapter Five will summarize the paper, discuss the research questions, review the discovered data and findings, and provide recommendations for Missouri public schools.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The final survey results consisting of 209 total respondents (23 superintendents, 38 principals or assistant principals, 89 classroom core subject teachers, 28 special area teachers, 28 special education teachers, and 3 respondents who skipped the role question), were uploaded to the SPSS software system. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were utilized to analyze the data and will be presented in this chapter to give insight into answers to the research questions in this study. The following research questions were addressed on four scales:

a. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may impact student achievement?
b. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it should be tied to teacher evaluation?
c. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward performance pay and how it may affect the recruitment and retention of teachers?
d. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may affect school climate?

Descriptive Statistics

The means, ranges, and standard deviations for the four scales on this survey instrument are shown below in Table 5. The figures for descriptive statistics are based upon ten questions in the Recruitment and Retention scale, nine questions in the School Climate scale, ten questions in

the Student Achievement scale, and five questions in the Teacher Evaluation scale as determined by the factor analysis.

Table 5: Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Scales

Scale	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range
Recruitment and Retention	27.71	7.19	20-40
School Climate	25.82	3.49	20-40
Student Achievement	29.86	6.08	20-40
Teacher Evaluation	14.51	3.08	10-30

Recruitment and Retention Scale

The Recruitment and Retention scale was designed to determine teachers, administrators, and superintendents' perceptions toward the implementation of teacher performance pay and how it may affect recruitment and retention of teachers. The mean for this scale was 27.71 and the standard deviation was 7.19. The range of possible values was 20 to 40. With a mean of 27.71, respondents were favorable or in agreement with the statements under the Recruitment and Retention scale. The standard deviation of 7.19 indicated the responses given were widely distributed. There did not appear to be a clear consensus among teachers, administrators, and superintendents on how teacher performance pay may affect the recruitment and retention of teachers.

School Climate Scale

The School Climate scale was designed to determine teachers, administrators, and superintendents' perceptions toward the implementation of teacher performance pay and how it may affect school climate. The mean was 25.82, the standard deviation was 3.49, and the range of possible values was 20-40. For this scale, higher values indicated the respondents were in

agreement with the statements. A standard deviation of 3.49 indicated the responses given were not widely distributed, giving the impression teachers, administrators, and superintendents were in relative agreement regarding the statements under the School Climate scale.

Student Achievement Scale

The Student Achievement scale was designed to determine teachers, administrators, and superintendents' perceptions toward the implementation of teacher performance pay and how it may affect student achievement. The mean was 29.86, the standard deviation was 6.08, and the range of possible values was 20-40. For this scale, higher values indicated the respondents were in agreement with the statements. A standard deviation of 6.08 is more widely distributed, giving the impression teachers, administrators, and superintendents were more varied in their responses and had stronger perceptions either way on the subject.

Teacher Evaluation Scale

The Teacher Evaluation scale was designed to determine teachers, administrators, and superintendents' perceptions toward the implementation of teacher performance pay and how it may affect teacher evaluation. The mean was 14.51, the standard deviation was 3.08, and the range of possible values was 20-40. The lower values indicated the respondents were not in agreement with the statements on this scale. A standard deviation of 3.08 indicated the responses were not widely distributed. This gives the impression teachers, administrators, and superintendents were not in relative agreement regarding the statements under the Teacher Evaluation scale.

Inferential Statistics

Out of the 37 original questions theorized to be in the four scales, 34 total questions held as valid through the actual survey process and loaded at high enough values to proceed with the

inferential statistical analysis. These questions loaded at a value high enough to warrant their use as reliable and valid survey items. To illustrate reliability, Cronbach's alpha value for student achievement was 0.91, 0.82 for teacher evaluation, 0.95 for recruitment and retention, and 0.68 for climate.

The inferential statistics were calculated using the 34 total questions that loaded to a respective scale. Data from these questions was analyzed to determine any differences and relationships in each demographic between responses by the survey participants. Categorizing the questions from the survey created the dependent variables of recruitment and retention, school climate, student achievement, and teacher evaluation. A *t*-test was conducted for the dependent variables and gender, and a one-way ANOVA was conducted for the dependent variables and the remaining five independent variables. The remaining five independent variables were years of experience in education, current role, primary role, association affiliation for teachers, and district size (based on student population). Tukey's HSD was conducted after the ANOVA tests to determine which demographic groups differed from each other.

Table 6: *t*-test Results—Gender: Male or Female

Scale	Male	Female	*T*	*df*
Recruitment and Retention	26.34 (6.42)	28.48 (7.42)	-1.98*	189
School Climate	25.28 (3.59)	26.07 (3.42)	-1.50	190
Student Achievement	28.05 (6.17)	29.75 (6.30)	-1.80	190
Teacher Evaluation	14.31 (2.95)	14.60 (3.18)	-0.61	194

Note. *= $p < .05$. Standard deviations appear in parentheses under the means.

Females (M = 28.48) were more favorable toward teacher performance pay having a positive effect on the recruitment and retention of teachers than males (M = 26.34). The

Recruitment and Retention scale was the only scale that showed statistical significance, or a true difference of $p < .05$.

Table 7: ANOVA for Recruitment and Retention Scale and Years in Education

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	168.04	3	56.01	1.09	.36
Within Groups	9734.02	189	51.50		
Total	9902.06	192			

p = n.s.

Table 8: ANOVA for School Climate Scale and Years in Education

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	64.17	3	21.39	1.77	.15
Within Groups	2279.84	189	12.06		
Total	2344.01	192			

p = n.s.

Table 9: ANOVA for Student Achievement Scale and Years in Education

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	80.85	3	26.95	.67	.57
Within Groups	7607.17	190	40.04		
Total	7688.02	193			

p = n.s.

Table 10: ANOVA for Teacher Evaluation Scale and Years in Education

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	2.79	3	.93	1.0	.96
Within Groups	1870.69	194	9.64		
Total	1873.48	197			

p = n.s.

For all four scales, there were no significant differences found between the four options (1-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-19 years, and 20+ years in education). This lack of significant difference suggested teachers, administrators, and superintendents were not favorable toward teacher performance pay regardless of the stage in their career. Nearly 70 percent of the respondents have been in education for 11+ years indicating veteran teachers, administrators, and superintendents were not open to teacher performance pay and alternatives to the traditional salary scale as they matured in their career.

Table 11: ANOVA for Recruitment and Retention Scale and Current Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	602.99	4	150.75	3.03	.02*
Within Groups	9293.99	187	49.70		
Total	9896.98	191			

* = $p < .05$

Table 12: ANOVA for School Climate Scale and Current Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	100.59	4	25.15	2.09	.08
Within Groups	2242.05	186	12.05		
Total	2342.64	190			

p = n.s.

Table 13: ANOVA for Student Achievement Scale and Current Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	1107.45	4	276.86	7.91	.00*
Within Groups	6580.52	188	35.00		
Total	7687.97	192			

* = $p < .001$

Table 14: ANOVA for Teacher Evaluation Scale and Current Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	72.20	4	18.05	1.92	.11
Within Groups	1794.80	191	9.40		
Total	1867.00	195			

p = n.s.

For the Recruitment and Retention scale, statistically significant differences were found between superintendents and classroom core teachers, $F(4, 187) = 3.03$, $p < .05$. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, classroom core teachers were found to be significantly more favorable toward the Recruitment and Retention scale than superintendents. For the Student Achievement scale, statistically significant differences were found between superintendents, principals/assistant principals, classroom core teachers, and special education educators, F(4,

188) = 7.91, $p < .001$. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, classroom core teachers were found to be significantly more favorable toward the Student Achievement scale than superintendents. For the Student Achievement scale, statistically significant differences were found between superintendents and special education educators. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, special education educators were found to be significantly more favorable toward the Student Achievement scale than superintendents. For the Student Achievement scale, statistically significant differences were found between principals/assistant principals and classroom core teachers. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, classroom core teachers were found to be significantly more favorable toward the Student Achievement scale than principals/assistant principals. For the Student Achievement scale, statistically significant differences were found between principals/assistant principals and special education educators. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, special education educators were found to be significantly more favorable toward the Student Achievement scale than principals/assistant principals.

Table 15: ANOVA for Recruitment and Retention Scale and Primary Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	694.33	3	231.45	4.77	.003*
Within Groups	9121.74	188	48.52		
Total	9816.08	191			

* = $p < .05$

Table 16: ANOVA for School Climate Scale and Primary Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	77.78	3	25.93	2.15	.09
Within Groups	2248.70	188	11.96		
Total	2326.48	191			

p = n.s.

Table 17: ANOVA for Student Achievement Scale and Primary Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	528.19	3	176.06	4.67	.004*
Within Groups	7159.83	190	37.68		
Total	7688.02	193			

* = $p < .05$

Table 18: ANOVA for Teacher Evaluation Scale and Primary Role

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	131.61	3	43.87	4.88	.003*
Within Groups	1735.64	193	8.99		
Total	1867.25	196			

* = $p < .05$

For the Recruitment and Retention scale, significant differences were found among the PK-5, 6-8, and K-12 groups, $F(3, 188) = 4.77$, $p < .05$. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, the PK-5 group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Recruitment and Retention scale than the K-12 group. The 6-8 group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Recruitment and Retention scale than the K-12 group. For the Student Achievement scale, significant differences were found among the PK-5, 6-8, and K-12 groups,

$F(3, 190) = 4.67$, $p < .05$. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, the PK-5 group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Student Achievement scale than the K-12 group. The 6-8 group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Student Achievement scale than the K-12 group. For the Teacher Evaluation scale, significant differences were found among the PK-5, 6-8, 9-12, and K-12 groups, $F(3, 193) = 4.88$, $p < .05$. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, the 6-8 group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Teacher Evaluation scale than the PK-5 group. The 6-8 group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Teacher Evaluation scale than the 9-12 group. The 6-8 group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Teacher Evaluation scale than the K-12 group.

Table 19: ANOVA for Recruitment and Retention Scale and Association Affiliation (Teachers)

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	709.08	4	177.27	3.71	.006*
Within Groups	8562.90	179	47.84		
Total	9271.98	183			

* = $p < .05$

Table 20: ANOVA for School Climate Scale and Association Affiliation (Teachers)

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	67.966	4	16.992	1.466	.214
Within Groups	2086.380	180	11.591		
Total	2154.346	184			

p = n.s.

Table 21: ANOVA for Student Achievement Scale and Association Affiliation (Teachers)

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	785.83	4	196.46	5.39	.000*
Within Groups	6630.80	182	36.43		
Total	7416.63	186			

* = $p < .001$

Table 22: ANOVA for Teacher Evaluation Scale and Association Affiliation (Teachers)

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	136.26	4	34.06	3.72	.006*
Within Groups	1676.74	183	9.16		
Total	1812.00	187			

* = $p < .05$

For the Recruitment and Retention scale, significant differences were found between the MSTA and Does Not Apply to Me groups, $F(4, 179) = 3.71$, $p < .05$. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, the MSTA group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Recruitment and Retention scale than the Does Not Apply to Me group. For the Student Achievement scale, significant differences were found between the MSTA and Does Not Apply to Me groups, $F(4, 182) = 5.39$, $p < .001$. When Tukey's HSD test was performed, the MSTA group was found to be significantly more favorable toward the Student Achievement scale than the Does Not Apply to Me group.

Table 23: ANOVA for Recruitment and Retention Scale and District Size

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	111.44	2	55.72	1.08	.34
Within Groups	9669.60	188	51.43		
Total	9781.04	190			

p = n.s.

Table 24: ANOVA for School Climate Scale and District Size

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	43.85	2	21.93	1.84	.16
Within Groups	2234.37	187	11.95		
Total	2278.22	189			

p = n.s.

Table 25: ANOVA for Student Achievement Scale and District Size

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	159.35	2	79.68	2.05	.13
Within Groups	7339.02	189	38.83		
Total	7498.37	191			

p = n.s.

Table 26: ANOVA for Teacher Evaluation Scale and District Size

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	p value
Between Groups	14.53	2	7.26	.77	.47
Within Groups	1822.07	192	9.49		
Total	1836.60	194			

p = n.s.

For all four scales, there were no significant differences found between the three options (0-1,000; 1,001-4,000; 4,001+). This lack of significant difference suggested teachers, administrators, and superintendents were not favorable toward teacher performance pay regardless of their district size.

Table 27 summarizes the significant differences found after the final survey data analysis.

Table 27: Significant Differences Summary

Demographic Statement	Recruitment and Retention	School Climate	Student Achievement	Teacher Evaluation
Gender	Female to Male	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Years of Experience	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Current Role	Class to Supt.	n.s.	Class to Supt. Sped. to Supt. Class to Principals/Asst. Sped. to Principals/Asst.	n.s.
Primary Role	PK-5 to K-12 6-8 to K-12	n.s.	PK-5 to K-12 6-8 to K-12	6-8 to PK-5 6-8 to 9-12 6-8 to K-12
Association Affiliation	MSTA to Does Not Apply to Me	n.s.	MSTA to Does Not Apply to Me	n.s.
District Size	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note. First denotation in each box represents the more favorable to that particular scale. n.s. = No significant difference.

Respondents' Comments

The final question asked for comments regarding teacher performance pay. The goal of this question was to gather any thoughts or perceptions respondents may have not had the opportunity to share. Approximately 32 percent of the respondents answered this open-ended question. There were 67 total written responses in the final results. The comments were related to the teachers, administrators, and superintendents' sense of agreement or disagreement with

performance-based teacher pay. One of the emerging themes was avoiding linking teacher performance pay to only standardized test results. The respondents mentioned a number of times that principal evaluations are an adequate measure of teacher performance, but evaluations cannot be the only deciding factor on whether or not a teacher receives performance pay. Along this same line of thinking, the concern that teacher performance pay can be perceived as more work emerged in the comments. Another theme was there is little supporting research of performance pay increasing student achievement. The comments are presented in the Appendix C.

Summary

The responses to the survey questions were analyzed to provide a broad picture of the perceptions of Missouri teachers, administrators, and superintendents toward teacher performance pay. Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to give insight into the survey results data. In addition, the six demographic questions were further analyzed to determine where significant differences among groups may occur. The *t*-tests, ANOVA values, and Tukey's HSD test results, were utilized to illustrate the significant differences. The results show there are statistically significant differences among a number of demographic factors, while other factors do not differ. The final question of the survey invited comments from the respondents. A total of 67 responses provided useful insights into performance-based teacher pay.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Exploring alternative avenues to increase student achievement and basing education on objective standards have been popular topics among boards of education and other policymakers in the United States in recent years (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Teacher pay has traditionally been based on a single salary schedule that defines a teacher's compensation based on years of experience and highest degree earned. However, many believe the single salary schedule is outdated and ineffective due to federal and state mandates. Missouri's waiver for the No Child Left Behind Act requirements was approved in June 2012. One of the principles of the waiver requires Missouri to hold educators accountable and attach a portion of a teacher's formal evaluation to student achievement data (Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education [MODESE], 2012). Performance pay continues to be examined by legislators, teachers, and professional organizations as a possible avenue to compensate educators. This study was designed to analyze the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward teacher performance pay. Guiding this study was the overarching research question: What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay? Supporting research questions included:

a. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may impact student achievement?

b. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it should be tied to teacher evaluation?
c. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward performance pay and how it may affect the recruitment and retention of teachers?
d. What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may affect school climate?

Summary of Methods

This study was conducted in public schools across the state of Missouri. Missouri is a state with 524 school districts, and all teachers, administrators, and superintendents employed in the selected districts were invited to participate in this study. For this survey, a stratified random sample of small, medium, and large K-12 Missouri public school districts was used. Small school districts were considered those with a population of less than 1,000 students. Medium school districts were those with a population of 1,000 to 4,000 students, while large school districts had a population of more than 4,000 students. The survey, informed email consent, ethics certificate, and Research Review Board (RRB) application were sent to the RRB in February 2014 for approval.

An important part of this study was the development of an attitudinal survey. The survey was tested to be valid and reliable with the purpose of being made available to future researchers. The pilot process started in spring of 2014 and included an expert pilot utilizing Rovinelli and Hambleton's index of item-objective congruency, a pre-pilot, and a 48-person pilot. At each pilot step, factor analyses were conducted, resulting in multiple revisions to the survey

instrument. To illustrate reliability, Cronbach's alpha value for Student Achievement was 0.91, 0.82 for Teacher Evaluation, 0.95 for Recruitment and Retention, and 0.68 for School Climate. These results were reliable enough to proceed with the full study. Once the study was complete, Cronbach's alpha was figured again based upon the factor analysis. The alpha value for the Student Achievement scale was 0.91, 0.82 for the Teacher Evaluation scale, 0.95 for the Recruitment and Retention scale, and 0.68 for the Climate scale. These alpha results showed the survey instrument to be highly reliable. The survey instrument from this study was tested to be valid, reliable, and ready to be utilized to determine whether or not educators supported the exploration of teacher performance pay implementation.

The researcher obtained a master email list of Missouri public schools superintendents and administrators from the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. Administrators were then asked to forward the survey to teachers. A window of three weeks was allowed for participants to complete the survey. A follow-up email was sent one week after the initial email as a reminder to those who had yet to complete the survey, as well as a thank you to those who had completed it. If subjects declined to participate, or did not take any action, by the end of the second week there was no further communication.

Summary of Findings

This study was designed to determine the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward teacher performance pay. More specifically, perceptions of the impact of a performance pay plan on student achievement, teacher evaluation, recruitment and retention of teachers, and school climate were explored.

Research question one: What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may impact student achievement? The Student Achievement scale focused on research question one and contained ten questions to explore how teacher performance pay would impact student achievement. Nearly 71 percent of teachers, administrators, and superintendents responded in the disagree or strongly disagree categories regarding performance pay increasing student achievement. Nearly 70 percent of respondents marked disagree or strongly disagree in the area of evaluating teachers based on student achievement. The mean for the Student Achievement scale was 29.86, indicating the respondents overall agreed with the statements made on the Student Achievement scale. However, the standard deviation of 6.08 showed varied views among the respondents. The results from these ten questions clearly indicated respondents were not supportive of teacher performance pay being tied to standardized achievement scores.

Research question two: What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it should be tied to teacher evaluation? Results from the Teacher Evaluation scale answered research question two. Nearly 68 percent of respondents answered disagree or strongly disagree regarding basing performance pay on administrator evaluations of teachers. Nearly 73 percent of respondents answered disagree or strongly disagree, clearly stating performance pay is not a fair way to reward teacher performance. The results from these five questions clearly indicated respondents were not supportive of teacher performance pay being tied to teacher evaluation.

Research question three: What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools toward performance pay and how it may affect the recruitment and retention of teachers? Research question three was answered by the

Recruitment and Retention scale. Nearly 70 to 75 percent of respondents answered disagree or strongly disagree on questions pertaining to performance pay aiding in the recruitment or retention of highly-qualified teachers. The mean for the Recruitment and Retention scale was 27.71 and the standard deviation was 7.19, indicating the respondents overall agreed with the statements, but were varied in their responses. The results from these ten questions indicated respondents were not supportive of teacher performance pay aiding in the recruitment or retention of highly-qualified teachers.

Research question four: What are the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public school systems toward performance pay and how it may affect school climate? The School Climate scale answered research question four. Nearly 75 percent of respondents stated performance pay would discourage teachers from helping each other develop their knowledge and skills. Nearly 70 percent of respondents believed performance pay would reduce collaboration among teachers. Nearly 89 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that performance pay would improve school climate and morale among staff. The results from these nine questions indicated respondents do not agree with teacher performance pay having a positive impact on school climate.

Limitations of the Study

Limitations to this study included the truthfulness of the survey participants and the survey format. The data used in this study was survey data obtained through an attitudinal survey. The truthfulness of survey participants may have affected the outcomes of the research. The respondents had to access a web-based survey to record their responses, which might have led to younger teachers and those who felt more comfortable using technology being more likely to participate.

With 69 superintendents, 224 principals, and 8,221 teachers represented, the size of the sample (n = 209) was not as large as desired. The data analysis and resulting figures would have been strengthened with a larger sample, but the results were encouraging enough to make conclusions and recommendations.

Significant Differences of Study with Previous Research

Performance pay in education is not a novel idea. School districts and states have attempted to change the current teacher compensation system, with the single salary schedule continuing to be the most widely-used compensation format. Survey results revealed nearly 71 percent of those participating disagreed or strongly disagreed with working for a performance pay plan based on student performance. Gratz (2009) warned systems which reward test scores will receive test scores, not necessarily effective learning. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan has placed teacher performance pay as a high priority. Secretary Duncan does not support the idea of basing teacher performance pay solely on student test scores; however, he does support student achievement being an integral part of any performance pay plan (Toch, 2009). Survey results further suggested performance pay would create a competitive environment rather than a collaborative environment. The review of literature suggested all educators in a building should be rewarded through a school-wide bonus program, which is one component of the successful ASPIRE program in Houston, Texas. This would eliminate individual competition by encouraging all stakeholders to work toward the common goal of increasing student achievement. Educators must be included in the development of a performance pay plan should Missouri move in that direction. Active stakeholder participation has been identified as one of the strengths of the ProComp system in Denver, Colorado. Another concern found in this study was principal evaluations being biased or unfair. One way to avoid this problem would be establishing

multi-criterion for awarding teacher performance pay, as demonstrated by the successful programs studied in the review of literature.

The idea of performance pay is based upon the assumption teachers are primarily motivated by money. In the review of literature it was noted that teaching is not about money but about a sense of calling and teachers work for the intrinsic reward of student success (Ramirez, 2010). Herzberg et al. (1967) found extrinsic rewards (hygiene factors) such as performance pay were not as important in job satisfaction as were intrinsic rewards (motivation factors). The National Education Association and American Federation of Teachers agree that additional compensation for teachers should include obtaining National Board Certification, working in hard-to-staff schools, serving as mentors, and participating in other professional activities (NEA, 2014; AFT, 2010). ProComp in Denver, Colorado, provides additional compensation for teachers who earn additional graduate degrees and national certificates. The most common disadvantage of performance pay identified by the survey participants was the factors in children's lives which were out of their control, such as socio-economic status, diverse backgrounds, home life, and parent involvement. Performance pay could be used as an avenue for filling hard-to-staff schools (Ravitch, 2010). The ASPIRE and ProComp programs, both successful performance pay programs, provide additional compensation for educators who serve in hard-to-staff schools.

Recommendations for Future Research

Based upon the findings of this study, the following recommendations include extensions or modifications to increase the awareness of perceptions regarding teacher performance pay. The review of literature in this study highlighted a number of effective performance pay programs. It would be beneficial to further study the effects of these specific successful programs on improving student achievement, school climate, evaluation practices,

and teacher recruitment and retention. Using the attitudinal survey in districts that are currently implementing teacher performance pay would be advantageous to schools considering teacher performance pay. Modification of participant groups to enlarge or alter the sample size could include other educational leaders in Missouri public schools or in the United States (e.g., other central office administrators and school board members) and various groups of public stakeholders involved in educational policies or practices (e.g., legislative members or leaders of teacher organizations). Due to the educational changes brought forth by Race to the Top and the No Child Left Behind waivers, further study in topics related to student achievement and teacher performance is essential. These topics include teacher quality, leadership styles during times of major accountability changes, value-added achievement, formative and summative assessment tools for evaluating instructional practices, teacher/student motivation, and the influence of accountability on those entering or not entering the teaching profession. Further research on incorporating value added or student growth models into a performance pay system would provide additional key insights into the perceptions of teachers, administrators, and superintendents.

Implications for Practice

Performance pay is and will continue to be a heated topic in education. From the research conducted it is apparent that teachers, administrators, and superintendents in Missouri public schools are not supportive of teacher performance pay. There are many additional factors beyond standardized test scores affecting students and their educational success. Multiple criteria should be included in any compensation plan created to determine the compensation and effectiveness of a teacher. If performance pay becomes a reality for educators, in-depth training on evaluating teachers using this system must be provided for administrators. Utilizing ideas

from the successful programs shared in the review of literature would allow for a future plan to be created. As education reformers create legislation and develop alternative plans to teacher compensation, educators must be involved in the development, implementation, and evaluation of the plan. Policymakers should ensure availability of funds in the current economic decline before implementing a performance pay plan and ensure there will be money to sustain the plan. Policymakers must also consider the negative implications performance pay may have on school climate if performance pay is based on individual achievements. Teachers may refrain from sharing and collaborating on instructional strategies. To prepare future education graduates, university officials should be included in the creation of criteria, such as a new teacher evaluation system. Teacher tenure is another issue to consider when looking at implementing a performance pay plan. More research needs to be conducted to determine if a performance pay system can co-exist with tenure. As changes in teacher pay are explored, it is essential all stakeholders collaboratively work together in order to create an equitable compensation plan for Missouri educators.

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Appendix A: Survey Instrument Versions

Expert Pilot #1 (first version)

The survey will use a Likert-type scale:

(1) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (3) Disagree or (4) Strongly Disagree

Impact on Student Achievement

1. I would work for performance pay if it was based on the test scores of students in my classroom.
2. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to building-wide student performance criteria.
3. Performance pay should be tied to district test scores on state achievement tests (MAP, TerraNova, EOC Exams).
4. I believe teachers performing at higher levels should be rewarded differently than teachers performing at lower levels.
5. My district should not implement a performance pay plan based on student achievement.
6. Teacher performance pay would provide an incentive for teachers to work harder toward improving student achievement on standardized tests.
7. Teachers who increase student achievement should receive a bonus through performance pay.
8. Gains in student test scores are appropriate measures of teacher effectiveness.
9. Performance pay would increase achievement in my school.
10. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to the performance of students in my classroom (individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, etc).

Teacher Evaluation

11. Performance pay should be tied to student evaluations of teachers.
12. Performance pay should be tied to parent evaluations of teachers.
13. Performance pay should be tied to principal evaluations of teachers.
14. My administrators do not evaluate teachers enough to make an accurate decision on whether or not a teacher should receive performance pay.
15. An end-of-year evaluation by the principal is an appropriate measure of my effectiveness to make an accurate decision on whether or not I should receive performance pay.
16. Teachers whose performance exceeds a school district's expectations as documented by performance evaluations, should receive performance pay.
17. Evaluations by administrators are an adequate measure to qualify for performance pay.
18. Performance pay will cause favoritism among administrators, rewarding those who don't "rock the boat."
19. It is fair to hold teachers accountable and base their pay on student achievement.
20. Performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance.

Recruitment and Retention

21. Performance pay would aid in the recruitment of highly-qualified teachers.
22. Performance pay would help retain highly-qualified teachers.
23. Performance pay will encourage good teachers to stay in a school district.
24. Performance pay would make working in a district more attractive.
25. Districts that offer performance pay would have more highly-qualified teachers apply for positions.
26. Performance pay would encourage highly-qualified teachers to remain in a district.

27. Districts that offer performance pay would appeal to teachers.
28. Performance pay would deter highly-qualified teachers from applying for available positions.
29. Performance pay will negatively impact the recruiting of future educators.
30. Performance pay will negatively impact the retention of highly-qualified teachers.

Climate

31. Performance pay would foster a climate of collaboration among teachers.
32. Performance pay would improve the morale among the staff in my district.
33. If performance pay were implemented, teachers would become competitive with one another.
34. Performance pay would create better relationships among staff members.
35. Performance pay would improve school climate.
36. Teachers' workloads would increase as a result of the implementation of teacher performance pay.
37. The possibility of a bonus would motivate me to work toward the goals.
38. Performance pay would encourage teachers to help each other develop their knowledge and skills.
39. Teachers who received more performance pay would be resented by those who did not receive as much.
40. Performance pay would reduce the sense of community among teachers.

Demographics:

1. Gender:

   Male Female

2. Years of experience in education:
    a. 1-5
    b. 6-10
    c. 11-19
    d. 20+
3. Current Role:
    a. Superintendent
    b. Principal or Assistant Principal
    c. Classroom—core subject (communication arts, math, science, social studies)
    d. Specialty area (art, physical education, music, vocational, business, library)
    e. Special Education
4. Primary Role:
    a. PK-5
    b. 6-8
    c. 9-12
5. Association affiliation (Teachers):
    a. MSTA
    b. MNEA
    c. MAFT
    d. More than one
    e. None
6. District size, based on student population:
    a. 0–1,000

b. 1,001–5,000

c. 5,000+

Please provide any further information or comments regarding teacher performance pay:

Final Survey Administered to Sample Population

The survey uses a Likert-type scale:

(1) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (3) Disagree or (4) Strongly Disagree:

Impact on Student Achievement

1. Performance pay should be tied to the standardized test scores of students in a teacher's classroom.
2. Performance pay should be tied to building-wide student performance criteria.
3. Performance pay should be tied to district test scores on state achievement tests (MAP, TerraNova, EOC Exams).
4. The implementation of performance based pay for teachers would increase student performance on standardized tests.
5. Teacher performance pay would provide an incentive for teachers to improve student achievement on standardized tests.
6. Teachers who increase student achievement should receive a bonus through performance pay.
7. Gains in student test scores are appropriate measures of teacher effectiveness.
8. Performance pay would increase achievement in my school.
9. I would work for performance pay if it was tied to the performance of students in my classroom (individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, etc).

Teacher Evaluation

10. Performance pay should be based on administrator evaluations of teachers.
11. Performance pay should be tied to principal evaluations of teachers.
12. My administrators do not evaluate teachers enough to make an accurate decision on whether or not a teacher should receive performance pay.
13. An end-of-year evaluation by the principal is an appropriate measure of my effectiveness to make an accurate decision on whether or not I should receive performance pay.
14. Teachers whose performance exceed a school district's expectations as documented by performance evaluations, should receive performance pay.
15. Evaluations by administrators are an adequate measure to qualify for performance pay.
16. Performance pay has the potential of influencing administrators' evaluations of teachers.
17. It is fair to evaluate teachers based on student achievement.
18. Performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance.

Recruitment and Retention of Teachers

19. Performance pay would aid in the recruitment of highly-qualified teachers.
20. Performance pay would help retain highly-qualified teachers.
21. Performance pay will encourage good teachers to stay in a school district.
22. Performance pay would make working in a district more attractive.
23. Districts that offer performance pay would have more highly-qualified teachers apply for positions.
24. Performance pay would encourage highly-qualified teachers to remain in a district.
25. Districts that offer performance pay would appeal to teachers.
26. Performance pay would deter highly-qualified teachers from applying for available positions.

27. Performance pay will negatively impact the recruiting of future educators.

28. Performance pay will negatively impact the retention of highly-qualified teachers.

Effect on School Climate

29. Performance pay would foster a climate of collaboration among teachers.

30. Performance pay would improve the morale among the staff in my district.

31. If performance pay were implemented, teachers would become competitive with one another.

32. Performance pay would create better relationships among staff members.

33. Performance pay would improve school climate.

34. Teacher performance pay would negatively affect school climate.

35. Performance pay would encourage teachers to help each other develop their knowledge and skills.

36. Teachers who received more performance pay would be resented by those who did not receive as much.

37. Performance pay would reduce the sense of collaboration among teachers.

Demographics:

38. Gender:

    Male Female

39. Years of experience in education:

    e. 1-5

    f. 6-10

    g. 11-19

    h. 20+

40. Current Role:

f. Superintendent

g. Principal or Assistant Principal

h. Classroom—core subject (communication arts, math, science, social studies)

i. Specialty area (art, physical education, music, vocational, business, library)

j. Special Education

41. Primary Role:

a. PK-5

b. 6-8

c. 9-12

42. Association affiliation (Teachers):

a. MSTA

b. MNEA

c. MAFT

d. More than one

e. None

43. District size, based on student population:

a. 0–1,000

b. 1,001–5,000

c. 5,000+

Please provide any further information or comments regarding teacher performance pay:

Appendix B: Consent Email

Dear Colleague,

My name is Julie Routh and I am the Principal at Bolivar Intermediate School in Bolivar, Missouri. I am a doctoral student at Southwest Baptist University and I am conducting a research study to gather information about teacher, administrator, and superintendent perceptions regarding teacher performance pay. I am surveying all public school educators in the state of Missouri, and I would like to ask for your participation. The survey should take no more than 15 minutes of your time to complete and is completely anonymous. Administrators, please forward this survey on to your teachers after you take the survey.

Your privacy is important, and your answers will be combined with other participants and reported in aggregate form. Information reported will not indicate individual participants or school districts. There is no penalty should you choose not to participate or answer all of the questions. Your completion and submission of the survey will indicate your consent to participate and permission to use the information that you have provided in my study.

Before you make a final decision about participation, please read the following statements about how your responses will be used and how your rights as a participant will be protected:

- Participation in the study is completely voluntary. You may stop participating at any point without penalty.
- You need not answer all of the questions.
- Your answers will be kept confidential. Results will be presented to others in summary form only, without names or other identifying information.
- Your participation will take approximately 15 minutes. During this time you will answer questions about how you perceive teacher performance pay.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the RRB Committee at Southwest Baptist University (326-1659). The committee believes that the research procedures adequately safeguard the subject's privacy, welfare, civil liberties, and rights.

You may contact me at 417-777-5160 if you have questions or concerns about your participation. If you would like a copy of the results of this study, you may contact me via email at jrouth@bolivarschools.org. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Julie Routh
Bolivar Intermediate School

Appendix C: Teachers, Administrators, and Superintendents' Comments

1. I am totally against performance pay. You will always have those educators who are 'better' than others, but the difference in teachers and the way they teach is what makes the world go round and education vary. Also, if we could hand pick our students each year, we would be the best teachers ever! I want to teach just the 'cream of the crop.' Will that make me a better teacher? Welcome to public education, where we are expected to teach EVERYONE no matter what their levels are or the disabilities that they may have. Our job is more of a challenge each year. Why do people constantly expect even more from us?

2. I think teachers need to be held accountable for student growth. I also believe teachers that increase student achievement should be recognized for their success. I do not believe that performance pay is the right direction. It will negatively impact the culture of school. If you have a strong principal that holds them accountable for data and student achievement, you will see the results.

3. I would like to see a model that allowed for the salary schedule to stay in place, just with the district option to extend contracts within ranges in the schedule. For a generalized example: paying a second year teacher at seventh year pay. In a small district with retention issues, this may be a viable option.

4. Performance pay would be impossible to measure for everyone working in schools. How do you determine performance pay for counselors, librarians, special ed teachers, and teachers not required to give standardized tests, etc.? I don't believe performance pay is a solution to poor academic performance. There are too many other factors to take into consideration.

5. No questions on teacher retention based on free/reduced lunch count...if large F/R lunch count, you'll see less teacher interest for positions. Affluent schools would flourish with teachers wanting to go there.

6. I am strongly opposed to teacher performance pay.

7. There are so many unintentional consequences: teachers vying for specific sections of classes or students, teachers keeping teaching strategies to themselves, manipulation of administration, etc. This also gives some an advantage over others.

8. When someone can come up with a leveling factor for such things as: class size, social-economic differences, core-class vs. co-curricular class (music/PE/shop/etc.) differences, grade level, cognitive ability differences, special education counts and modifications, and many others factors, then just maybe schools might be able to consider 'performance' pay. Public schools do not have the luxury of picking and choosing their students as do private, voucher, and charter schools...in those schools, performance pay may actually work, but not in public schools. Performance pay is the idea of those what want to eliminate public schools.

9. I feel that performance pay will only foster negativity in the staff rather than collaboration. I also feel that the pressure on principals will be very great and that, because of the 'perception' of performance being the key to increased salaries, it will open principals and districts up to more possibilities of lawsuits. I just don't see a fair way to administer the performance pay equitably.

10. I have previously worked in a Title 1 school with a 95% free and reduced lunch rate. We were all very hard working teachers and our administrator would not keep anyone that wasn't. With that being said, many years our scores struggled because if a student is worried about where they are going to sleep that night, where their next meal is coming from or how their family will pay the electric bill, they are not going to perform well on 'test' day. Who would be left to teach those students? Poor teachers who don't do well or don't care. If performance is based on pay, no one is going to want to teach at a poor performing school or want students in their classrooms that can't perform. I also wonder about cheating. If a teacher's paycheck and job is tied to their performance sometimes people get desperate and make very poor choices. I also think teachers would be less willing to help each other and share ideas because they would want to be the top performer. It takes a village to educate a child. It has also been shown in our district that different administrators evaluate differently; it seems to be very subjective if it is based on evaluations done by administrators. I think lots of thought needs to be given to the idea of pay based on performance or evaluations.

11. No teacher can control outside factors such as parent involvement or economic levels. Also, who would decide which teachers would get which students in an Elementary setting?

12. Why aren't administrators included in performance pay evaluations?

13. I believe performance pay would need to be tied to individual student growth. Not how they do on a test but how much progress is made from the first day of school to the last. This would be a nearly impossible task since every student enters the classroom with different skills, needs, and backgrounds.

14. School politics would play a major part in deciding which teacher would receive pay and which would not. It is not what you know or how your students achieve. It is who you are married to, related to, friends with and your political affiliation. I believe this would be the case in smaller school districts. It happens now and there is no performance pay. It is obvious that 'certain' educators get higher marks when they don't do 'higher mark worthy' work.

15. If students come to you unprepared from the year before, you are punished because you are bringing them up to the level they should be when they walk in your door. There is very little time for 'above and beyond'.

16. So many parents and students do not value education, so there is no effort put into daily work let alone standardized testing. The children are not held accountable for their efforts. Some don't even try when they know the correct answers.

17. Teachers cannot control how serious a student takes the test. A teacher can't control if a student accidentally skips questions or misunderstands the question.

18. I work with ELL students. There are numerous studies stating that students in the ELL program will score below their peers for at least 5-7 years. Some newer research suggests longer. Performance pay would make me very resentful of my peer educators because my test scores would revolve around a subgroup and theirs would not.

19. When discussing the issues of teacher pay based on student performance, it is important to keep in mind that many factors effect student performance other than just the quality of teaching. (Parent involvement, home life, attendance, genetics, etc.) To me this idea is just as crazy as a doctors' pay being based on the overall health of their patients.

20. There are far more variables in student performance than the teacher. The home life, the early educational background the students had, drugs, the amount of TV, video games, the peer group, sports, parent support all influence the performance of the students. Granted a good teacher can help bring out the best in a student, but the year to year differences between classes does not always show the skill of the teacher or the accomplishments the teacher has done.

21. Teachers will flock to more affluent schools where they do not have to struggle to find students who are self-motivated, have parental support, and who can read at grade level.

22. I think that we should all be evaluated on student achievement/progress every year, but to have my already 'low' paying/high stress job be tied to a student's performance on a standardized test weakens what little morale I have left.

23. Performance pay cannot be based on standardized test at the high school level. Students have free will to give 100% or not on any given test. It's not fair to base a teacher's pay on student performance when you can't control their performance. This would greatly affect future recruitment of teachers in any state. Why would anyone want to enter this profession when you have no control over your output?

24. The problem is that even with the best teachers if students don't try on test and score poorly, the teacher is penalized for it. I have heard several students say they don't care about the EOC's and standardized test. If they don't attempt to do the work, it is thought that the teacher is not doing their job. It is hard to motivate students that are more worried about their lives outside of school then what is happening in their academic career.

25. Performance pay would not be fair across the classes due to the different abilities of the individual students in each class.

26. As a special education teacher my students see progress on a very limited basis, and if there is progress it's not celebrated like MAP test scores are. I could work just as hard or

harder than somebody making more than me, but because my students receive special education I may never get the progress that they see. In my opinion there would be plenty of people who would be attracted to schools that have performance based pay. However, there would be too much competition and very little collaboration because performance based pay fosters a 'me first' mindset. In the end there are too many variables that cannot be compromised that would unfairly disqualify or qualify certain teachers for performance based pay.

27. Pedagogy is an art, not a science. I believe any attempt to evaluate a teacher is highly subjective at best. How can one person judge one song to be superior to another, neither can you do with teaching unless it was with really broad strokes?

28. Must be based on test scores, student growth, and fair evaluations.

29. I like the idea of salary bonus based on student progress, principal evaluation (there does need to be more), and professional development.

30. Administrators roles would have to change or supervisors hired (more costs) to oversee the performance evaluations. Either way, more people would be needed to handle the day to day classroom observations. Currently principals have too many responsibilities (too many hats) that require them to be in the office to handle parent visits, discipline issues, state mandated paperwork, etc. In addition, there would need to be ongoing training for those conducting the evaluations because classroom dynamics are changing very quickly, yearly. Within two years evaluators that are removed from the classroom lose touch and fall behind in the areas of instructional techniques, assessment procedures/instruments, student demographics, etc.

31. Test scores should not be used in determining performance pay, in small schools these numbers are skewed every year.

32. Administrators would need to be in classrooms on a regular basis-not just once a week. School districts are currently under funded by formula money, so currently performance pay is not even an option. Schools are just skirting by now. Transportation is a large budget item, but I don't foresee schools reducing bus service for regular routes or sporting events. Consequently, additional monies would have to come from the state to fund performance pay.

33. When you mention tests, I think the only tests that should be considered are those given throughout the school year. Ex. DRA, IRA, Unit Assessments

34. In very low socio-economic areas, it is very difficult to pin low achievement on teachers. As many studies have shown, the number one predictor of student performance is family situation and in schools like ours, it is a huge problem. I do agree that teachers can't use this as an excuse to not try and get the most out of kids---but there is no way you could compare the performance of my students in this poor, rural district in Southeast Missouri to the performance of the district I grew up in Springfield....

35. I would not ever want to be judged on the performance of my students on a particular test. The state tests do not currently give an adequate evaluation of what students know only looking at a testing situation for a day or two. We see the outside effects students must face.

36. There is no way to ensure that each teacher has the same demographics of students, so I am clearly not in support of performance pay.

37. I believe performance pay would increase teacher effectiveness, but it cannot be tied to only state testing. It would need to include district benchmark testing and student growth. I don't know how you would account for non-core teachers who do not do state or district testing and I do think teachers would resent each other based on who did and did not receive performance pay.

38. Teachers such as myself (social studies-not tested) would receive pay based on how well the teachers in the tested areas teach... how is it fair to reduce pay to the PE teacher when kids can't read? I don't see how it could be done fairly and accurately.

39. I feel that if teachers are evaluated on student performance, then how are the administrators going to be evaluated? They have to accept part of the blame and rewards of successful teachers . . . and if a teacher is not successful, are administrators not partly to blame because of lack of leadership, PD, or other factors that are in their control too? You can't put all of the responsibility on the teachers. Administrators have to shoulder their share and how are they going to be evaluated?

40. It was hard to answer some of these questions. I don't feel teachers should be paid for their performance. In my opinion, 'It's not about the income, it's about the outcome.' I teach because I love it and I want to see children grow in their education and become productive citizens in our world. If I'm a good teacher, then I shouldn't have to be paid extra for that because it's our job to be the best we can for the children we have been blessed with to teach. On another note, I disagree basing performance pay on test scores. When I was in college, I hated to take tests. I got nervous, scared, and tensed up every time we had a test. My test scores were not good at times, but I still passed with a GPA of around 3.5 and I have been teaching for 6 years now. If my teaching abilities were based off of my test scores in college, I may not have been hired to teach. With that being said, how can we give a performance pay to teachers based off their students test scores. These children could be just like me and not be a very good test taker, but have a high GPA and will probably go on to college, get a degree, and be a very productive citizen in our world, even if they had poor test scores. Students could also be sick on test taking days. My son went to districts for Ag Mechanics and he did poorly on his test. He also said he about passed out and didn't feel well. Once he got to my classroom later that day, he was running a fever and it even climbed to 100.6 by the end of the night. He performed his worst that day at districts because he was sick. There are so many factors in children's lives that can affect how they perform on tests and teachers shouldn't be paid based off of test scores. I could just keep going and going with my feelings about this, but I probably better stop. I love teaching with a passion and want all children to find something they are good at and excel

in it. You don't have to pay me more money for how I perform. I should perform well no matter if I'm paid for it or not, because it's my job and that's what I'm supposed to do.

41. It would encourage even more cheating on the tests.

42. In my opinion, school districts should hire qualified administrators to appropriately evaluate their teachers in all areas related to their performances as effective educators. Test scores are vary year to year and are dependent upon a wide range of factors beyond the school's control. Administrators should be able to determine the effectiveness of their teachers without using test scores. If they are not able to, then maybe they need to be reassessed for their knowledge and effectiveness. The more emphasis and pressure that is placed upon teachers because of test scores, I honestly believe will most definitely negatively impact true student learning. Almost, if not all, teaching, will be directly linked to 'taking the test' which will not prepare our students for the real world.

43. Overall, I think it is a bad idea. This would be similar to paying a coach for being more successful than another coach when one team has much more talent to work with that year. All abilities cycle and academic ability appears to be no different. We have strong classes go through and weaker classes. I do think a teacher who has low scores repeatedly should not remain in that position. It does not take long for a good administrator to identify weak teachers. Teacher performance pay may seem like a good idea if it was possible to determine that the teacher was the only factor to consider, but there are many issues that can have an impact on student performance: socioeconomics, student ability levels, student motivation, facilities, cost of materials for instruction. I think the list would be endless. I may not completely understand how performance pay would work. Just my opinion. Thanks

44. Dentists are not penalized for how many cavities their patients develop because they have no control over what their patients eat or how they take care of their teeth. In the same way teachers should not be penalized for lack of student learning because WE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER OUR STUDENTS MINDS. If children do not want to learn and care nothing about school there is nothing we can do about it. Period.

45. There are good and bad points to this like everything. I think teachers may work harder with incentive pay but the fact is parents play a big role in how well their child does in school too so parents have to be on board with the idea too. Also if the pay is decided on how well kids do on a test only that is not good because no matter how great of a teacher you are some kids just don't get it or simply do not try. A teachers pay cannot be based only on how well a child does on a test. Evaluation is very important and must be done several times during the year and the school must have a good leader to help those who are falling short with good ideas and help on how to improve performance.

46. I feel it should be based on more than just student test performance. There is more to education than just a test and teachers do way more than just test. If one works only with ID students what kind of performance would you look for?

47. I do not think that performance pay would offer a well-rounded education for students. Teachers would be more concerned with teaching to a test in order to receive pay.

48. I believe that performance pay is extremely hazardous to education. I think that if it is implemented many teachers will leave the field, ESPECIALLY in small districts where a single student can be 4-15% of the class population. The public knows so much about our jobs, and when students find out that their test scores affect how much a teacher is paid, or if the teacher is rehired would end all and any effectiveness in standardized test scores. It would also limit the effectiveness of teachers daily because they are doing things differently in their classroom to prevent groups of students from banding together and choosing to perform badly on purpose to 'punish' the teacher. I believe that it would end collaboration between teachers and increase competitiveness and bitterness. And it would encourage teachers to find ways to teach the test and only the test in order to get the bonus.

49. I think it will cause teachers to cheat and weaken collaboration among teachers. We cannot control some aspects of our students' lives, demographics, etc. & performance pay is unfair. I won't stay in education if my pay is based on a standardized test score.

50. Competition between teachers could be negative competitiveness resulting in: blackmail, poor cooperation between teachers, etc. I will retire if they tie pay to performance. I am from a small school. I have no choice in my students. It will only cause teachers to cheat on the test. I have a daughter getting her education degree. I told her if they go to merit pay I will encourage her to get another job. We will be educating our students with poorer quality teachers.

51. Rather than using standardized tests like EOC's and MAP. Student performance should be evaluated by using more frequent curriculum based measurements.

52. Performance pay would be beneficial for teachers who go the extra mile and have great test scores.

53. Performance pay would have to based on student achievement. Not on standardized testing results. I think that could be a small portion of the evaluation process but an overall view of the worth of a teacher is what is important. Are they improving the achievement levels of the students? In addition, teachers have merit and influence in ways that could never be measured. I think we need to raise expectations, increase salaries for teachers and administrators by 40% and make educators a sought after and extremely competitive career tract.

54. Every school has teachers that work the system and coast through the school year. However, if the job market for teachers were as competitive as it is for doctors and lawyers we would be able to weed out the ones who choose not to work hard, not challenge themselves, not challenge students and not do what is in the best interest of kids. Intrinsic motivation seems to be losing steam in the education field. We have to find a way to raise the expectations on everyone involved!!

55. As the answers will show I am very much against performance based pay. If a profession such as ours we have little control what happens outside our classrooms. Students' lives are often a train wreck and the student has no control over those aspects. Judging a teachers pay based on a student's performance on a test is unfair to the teacher and student. Ex. Students father came home and beat the mother and older sibling in a drunken rage and the student has to come to school the next day and take a test. Any individual that does not believe that this happens daily in our schools needs to spend more time in the classroom or become a counselor. If teachers are to be paid by performance and evaluations then administrators should be paid by the same standard. Administrators should be evaluated by their staff and parents. Any parameter set to evaluate a teacher should be in turn set to evaluate an administrator.

56. Performance pay takes the educational importance away from the students where it should always remain. We are here for student learning and success, not to use them as pawns to gain a higher paycheck amount. If the powers that be want to ruin education for years to come, pit teacher against teacher. Collaborating with fellow educators is what makes a good teacher an awesome teacher and makes the student body the winner. It makes me sad that this line of thinking is even being considered.

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58. Overall, I think there are many positive attributes that could result from teacher performance pay. My concern is that teachers would not be assessed as comprehensively as needed in order to make a fair judgment of whether or not performance pay was earned. Only basing the bonus off of test scores or principal evaluations does not give a clear indication of the effectiveness of the teacher. I feel that teacher performance pay would result in less collaboration among colleagues and some teachers would be resentful of others should they not receive the performance pay. It is also hard to determine performance pay when some teachers receive several gifted students and others receive several with diverse learning needs (achievement would look very different for those teachers). I think in order for it to be fair, performance pay would have to be tied to standards of achievement for individual students not a state-wide expectation.

59. I feel that performance pay does not affect everyone in the school setting (Encore, reading/math specialist, etc.). I also feel that newer teachers have a disadvantage because they do not have experience.

60. Teacher performance pay would most certainly deter me from continuing to work in the educational field. We cannot be held responsible for class population or the home lives of our students (which greatly impacts their educational success or failure). Performance pay would greatly decrease teacher morale and discourage teacher collaboration. If teacher performance pay was instituted, I would most definitely leave Bolivar R-1 school district

for a district with a lower population of free and reduced lunch - in the hopes of increasing my chances of getting a class population of students who would score well on standardized tests.

61. I do find that principal evaluation at the end of the year could be a good source to determine some criterion for performance pay; however, without knowing how often a principal is watching my teaching, interaction with students and parents, having limited conversations with me, or knowing the criterion they are using for assessment, this assessment may not be an accurate portrait of me as an educator. Therefore, the discrepancies between my pay or another's could be based upon appearances or limited testing strategies that do not show my students growth, social climates, and day to day learning---limiting both myself, my students, and my coworkers collaboration.

62. Performance pay would decrease the amount of collaboration in a grade level. Teachers will no longer be willing to share resources but become competitive. Classroom teachers with a class roster of average and below average students will feel that the odds are stacked against them compared to teachers who are granted a classroom of high achievers. It would be discouraging to see a neighboring teacher with a model classroom receive additional pay compared to a teacher with a truckload of problematic students. We all know it takes more energy to get positive results from a challenging classroom than a classroom of on grade level, self-regulated learners.

63. IF a district chose to have performance pay it should be based only on several administrator/principal evaluations. There are too many variables in student achievement for that to be a fair measure of success.

64. Student performance on tests may go up because they'll teach to test. too many politics in education-

65. I think there could be many positives by implementing such methods of rewards for the teachers if their students perform well. It would create some divide and bitterness by some in that they will be upset if a teacher is able to get the students to do well in their subject area but not in their own. There are so many ways to look at things but there is problems with how the Fine Arts classes are to be assessed when it comes to performance pay. The subjectivity of a principal or personal relationship bias will become a conflict in the end. It will ultimately impact the school education climate but to the extent of it remains unknown at this point and could very well differ from school to school. There is no ultimate solution to anything when it comes to education. As long as the main focus is to educate these kids to make smart decisions, make the most of their personal potential in all of life's obstacles and challenges, and embrace the inevitable grind of life as a young person growing up then we will be doing the students their due justice in providing the best total education they deserve and need.

66. As a retired teacher with +33 years of experience, I have dealt with the idea of performance pay from both a teaching viewpoint and that of an administrator. If you base performance pay strictly on test scores or principal evaluation, it becomes subjective. Example: your principal gives you a class of low performing students. The improvement

in their scores will be very different than a class of high preforming students. As far as principal evaluations, if you and your principal get crossways, what checks are there to keep a principal from not giving you the pay? A friend of mine had to do this in his school and teachers became very angry when someone received more pay than they did. Having been an administrator also, there were teachers that would not have deserved performance pay, but they thought they were high quality teachers. How do you make this decision? It seems to me that performance pay could be a good way to reward outstanding teachers, but how do you set the criteria? I had teachers who could jump through the hoops but still were not good teachers. It could very well foster a hostile relationship between administration and teachers and between teachers. The collaboration between teachers would suffer.

67. I can see merit to the idea of performance pay, but see it working best when appropriated and evaluated by teams, grade levels or schools rather than individuals. Individual performance pay may cause teachers to compete in an unhealthy way against one another.